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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Wally Kay Schultz, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 42095-2014 
) 
) 
) 
) Minidoka County Case CR2011-96 
) 
) 
Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County, Idaho 
HONORABLE Michael R. Crabtree, presiding, 
Sara Thomas, State Public Defender, 3050 Lake Harbor Ln. Ste. 100, Boise, Idaho 83703 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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Date: 4/25/2014 
Time: 09:24 AM 
Page 1 of 6 
Fifth Judicial District Court - Minidoka County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2011-0000096 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: LAURIE 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
1/21/2011 NCPC JANET New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief Michael R. Crabtree 
JANET Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings Michael R. Crabtree 
Paid by: Schultz #193761, Wally Kay (subject) 
Receipt number: 0000648 Dated: 2/3/2011 
Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: Schultz #193761, Wally 
Kay (subject) 
2/3/2011 APPR JANET Defendant: State of Idaho Appearance Through Michael R. Crabtree 
Attorney Lance D Stevenson 
DISQ JANET Disqualification Of Judge - Cause Michael R. Crabtree 
ANSW JANET Answer to successive post-conviction application Michael R. Crabtree 
2/25/2011 MISC JANET Amended answer to successive post conviction Michael R. Crabtree 
application 
3/30/2011 MISC JANET Successive Post-Conviction Brief Michael R. Crabtree 
10/3/2011 NOPD JANET Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued Michael R. Crabtree 
10/14/2011 MOTN JANET Motion to amend successive post-conviction brief Michael R. Crabtree 
NOTC JANET Notice to retain case Michael R. Crabtree 
11/3/2011 ORDR JANET Order to retain case Michael R. Crabtree 
HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/12/2011 03:00 Michael R. Crabtree 
PM) 
JANET Notice Of Hearing Michael R. Crabtree 
11/4/2011 HRVC JANET Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael R. Crabtree 
12/12/2011 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Amend (Per the Court - hrg was not requested) 
11/21/2011 ORDR JANET Order granting the petitioner's motion to amend Michael R. Crabtree 
successive post-conviction brief 
11/22/2011 MEMO JANET Memorandum (Pro Se) Michael R. Crabtree 
MISC JANET Objection to motion to amend successive Michael R. Crabtree 
post-conviction brief 
1/27/2012 MOTN JANET Motion and affidavit in support for appointment of Michael R. Crabtree 
counsel 
1/30/2012 ORDR JANET Order modifying deadline for amended pleadings Michael R. Crabtree 
1/31/2012 MISC JANET Successive Post-Conviction amendments under Michael R. Crabtree 
19-4908 
2/1/2012 ORPD JANET Subject: Schultz #193761, Wally Kay Order Michael R. Crabtree 
Appointing Public Defender Court appointed 
Steven R. McRae 
MISC JANET Rcvd from petitioner (exhibits) Michael R. Crabtree 
MISC JANET Rcvd from petitioner (exhibits) Michael R. Crabtree 
ORPD JANET Order Appointing Public Defender - Steven Michael R. Crabtree 
Macrae 
2/7/2012 MOTN JANET Motion to consolidate post-conviction proceedings Michael R. Crabtree 
(with CV-2011-662) 
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Page 2 of 6 Case: CV-2011-0000096 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
2/9/2012 ORDR JANET Minute Order regarding the Petitioner's pro se Michael R. Crabtree 
motion to consolidate post-conviction proceedings 
2/16/2012 ANSW JANET Answer to successive post-conviction Michael R Crabtree 
amendments 
MISC JANET Objection to consolidate post-conviction Michael R. Crabtree 
proceedings 
3/19/2012 AMCO JANET Verified amended successive petition for Michael R. Crabtree 
post-conviction relief 
MOTN JANET Motion to amend successive petition for Michael R. Crabtree 
post-conviction relief 
NOTC JANET Notice of seivice Michael R. Crabtree 
3/22/2012 MOTN SANTOS ExParte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD SANTOS Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
3/23/2012 ORDR SANTOS Order for Payment $1232.00 Michael R. Crabtree 
5/29/2012 ORDR JANET Order granting the petitioner's motion to amend Michael R. Crabtree 
successive petition for post-conviction relief 
6/6/2012 MOTN JANET Ex parte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
6/7/2012 ORDR JANET Order for payment ($82. 50) Michael R. Crabtree 
7/19/2012 MOTN JANET Motion for summary dismissal of successive post Michael R. Crabtree 
conviction and brief in support 
7/20/2012 ORDR JANET Scheduling order regarding the State's motion for Michael R. Crabtree 
summary dismissal 
8/6/2012 MOTN JANET Ex-Parte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
8/7/2012 ORDR JANET Order for payment ($159.50) Michael R. Crabtree 
8/16/2012 MISC JANET Petitioner's brief in opposition to State's motion Michael R. Crabtree 
for summary dismissal 
8/30/2012 MISC JANET State's reply to petitioner's brief in opposition to Michael R. Crabtree 
state's motion for summary dismissal 
9/5/2012 MOTN JANET Ex-Parte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
ORDR JANET Order for payment ($407.00) Michael R. Crabtree 
9/13/2012 ORDR JANET Order granting the state's motion for summary Michael R. Crabtree 
dismissal 
JDMT JANET Judgment Michael R. Crabtree 
CDIS JANET Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho, Michael R. Crabtree 
Defendant; Schultz #193761, Wally Kay, Subject. 
Filing date: 9/13/2012 
9/26/2012 APSC JANET Appealed To The Supreme Court - Notice of Michael R. Crabtree 
Appeal 
MOTN JANET Motion for appointment of state appellate public Michael R Crabtree 
defender 
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Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
9/28/2012 ORDR JANET Notice and Order for appointment of State Michael R. Crabtree 
appellate public defender 
10/2/2012 MOTN SANTOS ExParte Motion for Payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD SANTOS Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
10/11/2012 ORDR JANET Order for payment ($236.50) Michael R. Crabtree 
MISC SANTOS Clerk's Certificate of Appeal filed Michael R. Crabtree 
11/13/2012 MISC SANTOS Acknowledgment of Service by Respondent Michael R. Crabtree 
Counsel 
11/15/2012 MISC SANTOS Acknowledgment of Service by Appellant Michael R. Crabtree 
Counsel 
11/20/2012 NOTC JANET Notice of attorney change of contact information Michael R. Crabtree 
7/31/2013 OPIN SANTOS Unpublished Opinion and Shall Not Be Cited as Michael R. Crabtree 
Authority 
8/27/2013 REMT SANTOS Remittitur Michael R. Crabtree 
9/5/2013 NOTC JANET Notice of intent to dismiss post-conviction Michael R. Crabtree 
application 
9/6/2013 AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
MOTN JANET Ex-Parte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
9/9/2013 ORDR JANET Order for payment ($126.50 to McRae) Michael R. Crabtree 
9/25/2013 MOTN JANET Motion to amend successive petition for Michael R. Crabtree 
post-conviction relief and reply to Notice of Intent 
to Dismiss 
10/2/2013 HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/28/2013 01:30 Michael R. Crabtree 
PM) Hearing on Court's Notice of intent to 
dismiss and Petitioner's motion to amend 
successive petition 
JANET Notice Of Hearing Michael R Crabtree 
MOTN JANET Ex-Parte Motion for payment Michael R Crabtree 
AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven R McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
10/7/2013 ORDR JANET Order for payment $506.00 to Steve McRae Michael R Crabtree 
10/28/2013 CMIN JANET Court Minutes Michael R. Crabtree 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 10/28/2013 
Time: 1 :46 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Janet Sunderland 
Tape Number: 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Lance Stevenson 
Party: Wally Schultz #193761, Attorney: Steven 
McRae 
ADVS JANET Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael R Crabtree 
10/28/2013 01 30 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Minidoka County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2011-0000096 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: LAURIE 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
10/31/2013 ORDR JANET Order regarding the Court's notice of intent to Michael R. Crabtree 
dismiss and the Petitioner's motion to amend 
successive petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
11/5/2013 MOTN JANET Ex-Parte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
ORDR JANET Order for payment ($330.00 to Steven McRae) Michael R. Crabtree 
11/6/2013 PETN JANET Second Verified Amended Successive Petition for Michael R. Crabtree 
Post-Conviction Relief 
11/26/2013 ANSW JANET Answer to second verified amended successive Michael R. Crabtree 
petition for post conviction relief 
12/6/2013 HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 01/17/2014 Michael R. Crabtree 
01 :30 PM) Post-Conviction Trial 
MOTN JANET Ex-Parte motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven R. Mcrae Michael R. Crabtree 
ORDR JANET Order for payment ($99.00 to McRae) Michael R. Crabtree 
12/12/2013 MOTN LAURIE Motion for Summary dismissal and Brief in Michael R. Crabtree 
Support 
1/2/2014 MISC JANET Petitioner's response to Respondent's Motion for Michael R. Crabtree 
summary judgment 
1/3/2014 ORDR JANET Order vacating Court Trial and notice of hearing Michael R. Crabtree 
on the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal 
HRVC JANET Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on Michael R. Crabtree 
01/17/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Post-Conviction Trial 
HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/17/2014 01:30 Michael R. Crabtree 
PM) Motion for Summary Dismissal 
MOTN JANET Ex-parte motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
AFFD JANET Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
1/6/2014 ORDR JANET Order for payment ($423.50 to Steven McRae) Michael R. Crabtree 
1/7/2014 MISC JANET Reply to petitioner's response to State's motion Michael R. Crabtree 
for summary dismissal 
1/10/2014 STIP JANET Stipulation to vacate hearing Michael R. Crabtree 
1/13/2014 ORDR JANET Order to vacate hearing (and note of hrg) Michael R. Crabtree 
HRVC JANET Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael R. Crabtree 
01/17/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
for Summary Dismissal 
HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/07/2014 01 :30 Michael R. Crabtree 
PM) Motion for Summary Dismissal 
1/27/2014 CONT JANET Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael R. Crabtree 
02/07/2014 01:30 PM: Continued Motion for 
Summary Dismissal 
1/29/2014 MISC JANET Petitioner's response to respondent's additional Michael R. Crabtree 
basis for summary judgment 
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Minidoka County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2011-0000096 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: LAURIE 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date 
1/31/2014 
2/5/2014 
2/27/2014 
3/6/2014 
3/11/2014 
3/12/2014 
4/4/2014 
4/7/2014 
4/9/2014 
Code 
MOTN 
ORDR 
CONT 
HRSC 
MOTN 
AFFD 
ORDR 
NOTC 
HRVC 
MOTN 
AFFD 
ORDR 
MISC 
HRSC 
MOTN 
AFFD 
ORDR 
CMIN 
ADVS 
ORDR 
JDMT 
User 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
LAURIE 
LAURIE 
LAURIE 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
JANET 
Judge 
Motion to continue hearing Michael R. Crabtree 
Order to continue hearing Michael R. Crabtree 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael R. Crabtree 
02/07/2014 01:30 PM: Continued Motion for 
summary dismissal 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/21/2014 01 :30 Michael R. Crabtree 
PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Ex-Parte Motion for payment 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae Michael R. Crabtree 
Order for Payment (Conflict PD) ($462 to Steve Michael R. Crabtree 
McRae) 
Notice of intent to dismiss post-conviction 
application and order vacating hearing 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Michael R. Crabtree 
03/21/2014 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
for Summary Dismissal 
Ex-Parte Motion for payment Michael R. Crabtree 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for payment ($115. 50) 
Michael R. Crabtree 
John K. Butler 
Petitioner's reply to notice of intent to dismiss Michael R. Crabtree 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/07/2014 01 :30 Michael R. Crabtree 
PM) Petitioner's response to Court's notice of 
intent to dismiss 
Notice Of Hearing 
Ex Parte Motion for Payment 
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae 
Order for Payment ($291.50 to Steve McRae) 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Court Minutes Michael R. Crabtree 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/7/2014 
Time: 1 :42 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Janet Sunderland 
Tape Number: 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Lance Stevenson 
Party: Wally Schultz, Attorney: Steven McRae 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
04/07/2014 01 :30 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement 
Order dismissing post-conviction application 
Judgment 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
7 of 109
7 of 109
Date: 4/25/2014 
Time: 09:24 AM 
Page 6 of 6 
Fifth Judicial District Court - Minidoka County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2011-0000096 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User 
4/23/2014 APSC JANET Appealed To The Supreme Court - Notice of 
Appeal 
MOTN JANET Motion for appointment of state appellate public 
defender 
User: LAURIE 
Judge 
Michael R. Crabtree 
Michael R. Crabtree 
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IN THE DISlRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, Case No. CV-2011-96 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
DISMISS POST-CONVICTION 
APPLICATION 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz (hereafter "Mr. Schultz") was found guilty after 
trial of felony domestic battery in Minidoka County case CR-2005-1139. He pied guilty 
pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a controlled substance in Minidoka County 
case CR-2005-884. On December 15, 2005, the court sentenced Mr. Schultz and retained 
jurisdiction in both cases. Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the court placed 
Mr. Schultz on probation in both cases pursuant to Temporary Orders on Rider Review, 
entered May 22, 2006. On May 25, 2006, the court entered formal Orders upon 180 Day 
Review Hearing. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION CV-2011-96 Page I 
11 of 109
11 of 109
Mr. Schultz filed an appeal in both cases on July 6, 2006, forty-five days after the 
entry of the Temporary Orders on Rider Review and forty-two days after the entry of the 
Orders upon 180 Day Review Hearing. 1 On appeal, the State argued that the forty-two 
day timeframe for filing an appeal began to run when the court entered the Temporary 
Orders on Rider Review. On that basis, the State argued that the appeals were untimely 
and should be dismissed. 
On January 13, 2009, after the State filed its brief on appeal, Mr. Schultz filed a 
post-conviction case, Minidoka County case CV-2009-4 7, regarding the drug -possession - ----- -- -· · 
case, CR-2005-884. He alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, 
although he did not specifically allege that his attorney failed to file a timely appeal. He 
received appointed counsel. On February 20, 2009, Mr. Schultz filed a pro se document 
entitled "Ammendment [sic] to Post-Conviction," attempting to raise an additional claim 
on post-conviction that his attorney in the underlying criminal cases, David Pena 
(hereafter "Mr. Pena"), had failed to file a timely appeal. 
On March 24, 2009, Mr. Schultz filed a post-conviction case, Minidoka County 
case CV-2009-221, regarding the domestic battery case, CR-2005-1139. He alleged that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Mr. Pena, but he did not specifically 
allege that Mr. Pena failed to file a timely appeal. He received appointed counsel. 
On May 29, 2009, the Idaho Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Schultz's direct 
appeal because it was untimely filed. See State v. Schultz, 147 Idaho 675, 214 P.3d 661 
(Ct.App.2009). The remittitur was issued on August 27, 2009. 
1 Mr. Schultz subsequently violated his probation. On August 13, 2007, the court revoked his probation and committed him to the custody ofth.e Idaho Department of Correction to serve h.is sentences. 
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The State subsequently filed Motions to Dismiss in both post-conviction cases, 
arguing that Mr. Schultz's petitions bad been filed outside the one-year statute of 
limitations provided in Idaho Code § I9-4902(a). The statute of limitations for Mr. 
Schultz's post-conviction actions began to run when the time for direct appeal expired on 
July 3, 2006, forty-two days after the trial court entered its Temporary Orders on Rider 
Review. It expired on July 3, 2007. Mr. Schultz filed a pro se supplemental brief in both 
of his post-conviction cases, arguing that Mr. Pena failed to file timely appeals in the 
underlying criminal cases .. 
On January 8, 2010, the trial court entered orders in both post-conviction cases 
granting the State's Motions to Dismiss. Mr. Schultz appealed. On May 9, 2011, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Mr. Schultz's post-
conviction petitions for being untimely filed. See Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 256 
P.3d 791 (CtApp.2011). 
On January 21, 2011, Mr. Schultz filed the successive post-conviction petition in 
this case. On March 19, 2012, he filed a Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. On July 19, 2012, the State filed a "Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Successive Post-Conviction [sic] and Brief in Support." The court entered an Order 
Granting the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on September 13, 2012. 
Mr. Schultz filed an appeal. On July 31, 2013, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued 
an unpublished opinion in which it reversed the court's Order Granting the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal on the basis that this court dismissed Mr. Schultz's 
petition on grounds for which no notice was given. The case was remanded for further 
proceedings. The remittitur was issued on August 23, 2013. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION cv.2011-96 Page3 
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The court hereby gives notice to the parties of its intent to dismiss Mr. Schultz's 
Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
DISCUSSION 
In the Verified Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz raises two categories of 
claims for post-conviction relief: (1) he contends that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel from his court-appointed attorney, Clayne Zollinger (hereafter "Mr. Z.Ollinger"), 
in his prior post-conviction cases CV-2009-47 and CV-2009-221; and (2) he contends 
that, based on newly discovered information regarding. the.--misconduct of forensic · 
scientists at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory, his due process rights and his 
confrontation rights were violated in the underlying criminal case, CR-2005-884. 
When a court is satisfied that a post-conviction applicant "is not entitled to post-
conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may 
indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing." 
I.C. § 19-4906(b). The court intends to dismiss Mr. Schultz's application for post-
conviction relief for the following reasons: (1) Mr. Schultz's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding Mr. Zollinger do not constitute legally cognizable claims 
for post-conviction relief; and (2) Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a prirna facie case for 
post-conviction relief on his claims regarding misconduct at the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Laboratory. 
1. Claims regarding ineffective assistance of post-eonvietion counsel. 
Mr. Schultz contends that Mr. Zollinger, his attorney in his prior post-conviction 
cases, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) failing to contact Mr. Pena to 
secme information that Mr. Schultz requested Mr. Pena file an appeal on December 12, 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION CV-2011-96 Page4 
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2005; (2) failing to contact Mr. Schultz's appellate counsel to secure an affidavit or 
information regarding the events of Mr. Schultz's direct appeal in the underlying criminal 
cases; (3) failing to make the arguments contained in Mr. Schultz's Supplemental Brief in 
Support of Post-Conviction Relief; (4) failing to distinguish the facts of Mr. Schultz's 
case from the facts set forth in Loman v. State, 138 Idaho 1, 56 P.3d 158 (Ct.App.2002); 
(5) failing to argue effectively that Mr. Schultz was ''wronged" by Mr. Pena in the 
underlying criminal cases; and (6) failing to argue effectively in opposition to the State's 
motions to dismiss in the two prior post-conviction cases. 
An applicant for post-conviction relief does not have a constitutional or statutory 
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 
340, 343, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct.App.2007). For this reason, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel may not be brought in a subsequent post-conviction 
case. Id. Standing alone, such a claim does not provide grounds for post-conviction relief. 
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438,441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct.App.2006). 
The ineffectiveness of prior post-conviction counsel may provide sufficient 
reason to permit an applicant for post-conviction relief to raise grounds for relief that 
were adjudicated or waived in a prior proceeding. Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441, 128 P .3d at 
978. Idaho Code § 19-4908 provides that all grounds for post-conviction relief available 
to a post-conviction application must be raised in the original, supplemental or amended 
application. Any claim that has been finally adjudicated, not raised, or waived in the prior 
proceeding may not be raised in a subsequent post-conviction application "unless the 
court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or 
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." J.C. § 19-
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4908. "[A]n allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-
conviction action due to the deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel. if true, provides 
sufficient reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a subsequent petition." 
Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441, 128 P .3d at 978 (italics added). 
In this case, Mr. Schultz has asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
only against Mr. Zollinger, his attorney in the two prior post-conviction cases. Although 
Mr. Schultz's assertions regarding Mr. Zollinger's performance might have provided a 
sufficient reason to permit Mr. Schultz to assert certain. claims regarding Mr. Pena·'s 
performance in the underlying criminal cases, Mr. Schultz has not raised any claims of 
ineffective assistance of cowisel regarding Mr. Pena in this post-conviction case. 
Therefore, these claims regarding Mr. Zollinger, standing alone, do not constitute legally 
cognizable claims for post-conviction retie£ 
2. Claims regarding misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory. 
Between 2003 and 2011, several forensic scientists allegedly maintained an 
unauthorized box of controlled substances at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory 
in Pocatello, Idaho. The controlled substances in the box were not subject to 
documentation, tracking, or auditing. Although there is no indication that this conduct 
had any effect on the accuracy and reliability of the forensic testing of controlled 
substances in the laboratory, it allegedly violated the terms of the Forensics Quality 
Manual and other internal laboratory policies. This information was discovered and 
provided to Mr. Schultz in 2011. For ease of reference, this information will be referred 
to hereafter as "the subject information." 
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Mr. Schultz contends that he could have used the subject information at trial to 
impeach the credibility of Skyler Anderson (hereafter "Mr. Anderson"), the forensic 
scientist that performed the testing on the controlled substance in the underlying criminal 
case, CR-2005-884. Mr. Schultz claims that the prosecution failed to disclose this 
information, and thereby violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and his confrontation 
right under the Sixth Amendment. See I.C. § 19-4901 (1 ). He also appears to be arguing 
that the subject information constitutes newly discovered evidence that requires vacation 
of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. See I.C. § 19-4901 ( 4 ). These issues 
will be addressed separately below. 
a. Alleged Brady violation 
In a criminal case, the State is required "to disclose to the defense prior to trial all 
material exculpatory and impeachment evidence known to the state or in its possession." 
Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 162 P.3d 794 (Ct.App.2007) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)) (emphasis in original). The elements 
of a Brady due process violation are as follows: (1) "The evidence at issue must be 
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching"; 
(2) "that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently"; and (3) "prejudice must have ensued." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
355, 380, 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 
(1999)). 
Impeachment evidence "is special in relation to the fairness of a trial not in 
respect to whether a plea is voluntary." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376, 
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390 (2004) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)) (emphasis in 
original). Therefore, where a defendant pleads guilty, ''the United States Constitution 
does not require the State to disclose material impeachment information prior to entering 
a plea agreement with the defendant." Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418, 162 P.3d at 797 (quoting 
Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d at 390) (emphasis added). 
The undisputed facts are that Mr. Schultz pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement 
and the underlying criminal case never proceeded to trial. The evidence regarding 
misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory .is impeachment evidence, not 
exculpatory evidence.2 Therefore, even assuming the State was aware of or had 
possession of the subject information while the underlying criminal case was pending, it 
had no constitutional obligation to disclose this evidence prior to entering into a plea 
agreement with Mr. Schultz. Where there would have been no obligation to disclose, it 
cannot be said that the State wrongfully suppressed the evidence under the second 
element of a Brady due process violation set forth above. 
Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a prima facie case on all of the elements of a 
Brady due process violation in his post-conviction petition. 
b. Alleged violation of Mr. Schultz's confrontation rights 
Pursuant to the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment, a criminal 
defendant has the right .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. 
2 Mr. Schultz bas taken the position that he could have used the subject information to impeach Mr. 
Anderson. He has not argued that it is exculpatory evidence. Exculpatory evidence ''tends to clear an 
accused ofa11eged guilt, excuses the actions of the accused, or tends to reduce punishment." Baker v. State, 
142 Idaho 411,422, 128 P.3d 948,959 (Ct.App.2005). Mr. Schultz has presented no evidence to show that 
Mr. Anderson's misconduct at the laboratory had any effect on the accuracy of the test results in the 
underlying criminal case. The subject information may have been used by the defense as impeachment 
evidence against Mr. Anderson, but it does not tend to negate Mr. Schultz's guilt, excuse his actions, or 
reduce his culpability. Therefore, it is not exculpatory evidence. 
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amend. VI. "Before trial, the Confrontation Clause does not compel pretrial discovery, 
which may aid in effective cross-examination." State v. Davis, 152 Idaho 652, 273 P.3d 
693, 696 (Ct.App.2011). Further, a defendant's plea of guilty waives the confrontation 
right. See State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007). 
Mr. Schultz's claim that his confrontation rights were violated is bare and 
conclusory. This case never proceeded to trial. Mr. Schultz's confrontation rights did not 
compel pretrial discovery of information that would aid in effective cross-examination of 
Mr. Anderson. Further, Mr. Schultz waived his right to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him when he pied guilty. He has not alleged that this waiver was invalid. 
Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a prim.a facie case on his claim of a violation of 
his confrontation rights in his post-conviction petition. 
c. Newly discovered evidence 
When a petitioner includes a claim in a post-conviction petition based on evidence 
of material facts not previously presented, the court examines the claim under the 
standard for a motion for new trial subsequent to a jury verdict. Rodgers v. State, 129 
Idaho 720, 723, 932 P.2d 348, 351 (1997). A new trial based on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence is warranted only where the defendant shows: "(1) the evidence is 
newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence 
is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an 
acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the 
part of the defendant." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) 
(citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976)). 
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Mr. Schultz's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is bare, 
conclusory, and unsupported by admissible evidence. Even assuming that Mr. Schultz has 
met his burden on (1) and (4) above, he has not shown that the subject information is 
anything other than impeachment evidence. Further, Mr. Schultz has failed to produce 
admissible evidence showing that the subject information would probably produce an 
acquittal. While it might have been used to challenge Mr. Anderson's veracity as a 
witness at trial, it does not directly challenge the accuracy of the results of his forensic 
testing. The subject information does not reduce or negate Mr. Schultz's culpability. 
Simply stating that the subject information would probably produce an acquittal, without 
any evidence to support such a claim, is insufficient to support a post-conviction claim. 
Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a pritna facie case on all of the elements of a 
claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in his post-conviction petition. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing considerations and analysis, the court is satisfied that Mr. 
Schultz is not entitled to post-conviction relief and that there would be no purpose served 
by further proceedings. The court gives notice that it intends to dismiss Mr. Schultz's 
Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Mr. Schultz has 
twenty (20) days to reply as set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906(b ). 
3 0~ ~·~-=---=:::::::::::;,--""?4~~~ It is so ORDERED this __ day of August, 2013. 
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
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Case No. CV-2011-96 
MOTION TO AMEND SUCCESSIVE 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND REPLY TO NOTICE OF 
INTENT TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW. Petitioner. Wally Kay Schultz, by and through his attomey of record, 
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and seeks leave to amend the Petitioner's 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief as contained in the Second Verified Amended 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief(the "Verified Petition"). which is attached hereto 
Petitioner seeks to make the amendment to the Petitioner's successive post-conviction 
petition following the Court's recent Notice of Intent to Dismiss PostuConviction Application 
filed September 5, 2013(the "Notice oflntent"). As this Court is aware, Pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 19-4906(b), a Court can, by its own volition, dismiss a post-conviction petition. which the 
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Court has done in this matter with the Notice ofintcnt. However, in order to do so, the Court 
must grant the post-conviction petitioner "an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed 
dismissal.", also which this Court has done in the Notice oflntent. Id. 
In Garza v. S1a1e. 139 Idaho 533, 537. 82 P.3d 445,449 (Idaho 2003), the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated that the purpose of the 20 day reply period is to allow the Petitioner an opportunity 
to submit an amended petition to cure deficiencies in the petition, if possible. "It appears that 
thae legislators 'Viewed the 20-day reply period as tm opportunity to submit gn amended 
application, not as a requirement to receiving n ruling on the merits of an application." Garza 
v. State, 139 Idaho 533,537, 82 P.3d 445,449 (Idaho 2003) (emphasis added). 
In the present matter, the Court has shown in Count One of the Verified Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that the Petitioner had a deficiency in his pleading in failing 
to allege that David Pena•s performance in the underlying criminal case was ineffective. 
Petitioner now seeks to amend the petition - and Count One only- so as to remedy this 
deficiency in Petitioner• s prior petition as was explained in the Notice of Intent. 
Furthermore, Petitioner requests that this Motion be treated as an answer to the Court's 
Notice of Intent and allow the Petitioner to proceed - with the cured petition for post-conviction 
relief - pursuant to Idaho Code § I 9-4906(b ). 
In the event that there is an objection to this Motion to Amend Successive Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief, Petitioner requests a hearing on all issues. 
DATED this 251h day of September, 2012. 
~~~-
By~ 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
I 
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, ) 
) Case No. CV-2011-96 
Petitioner, ) 
) VERIFIED AMENDED SUCCESSIVE 
vs. ) PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
) RELIEF 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, wany Kay Schultz, by and through his attorney of 
record, Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and submits this Amended 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
Petitioner alleges: 
1. The Petitioner Is currently detained in the Idaho Correctlonal Center. 
2. The under1ylng offenses In this matter are from Minidoka cases CR-2005--
884 (the "Drug Caaen) and CR-2005-1139 (the •eattery Case"). Convictions in these 
matters occurred in the Fifth Judicial District of Minidoka County, Rupert, Idaho . 
.. -----. EXHIBrT 
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both of these cases into one post-conviction case for the purposes of expediency and judicial 
economy and because the claim of Count One as contained herein is the same for both cases. 
3. In the Drug Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of 
Possession ofa Controlled Substance. LC.§ 37-2732(C)(l). Sentence was imposed on 
December 15, 2005, and the Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate period of ioouceration of 
3 years and an indetenninate period of incarceration of 4 years. 
4. In the Battery Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of 
Battery, LC.§ 18-903. Sentence was imposed on December 15, 2005, and the Petitioner was 
sentenced to a determinate period of incarceration of 5 years and an indeterminate period of 
incarceration of 5 years. 
5. Petitioner sought post conviction relief in each of the Drug Case and the Battery 
Case in Minidoka County Case Nos. CV-2009-221 and CV-2009-47, respectively (the "Original 
Post Conviction Cases"). ln both of the Original Post Conviction Cases, Petitioner was 
represented by counsel, Clayne S. Zollinger, Jr. ("ZOllinger"). In the Original Post Conviction 
Cases, the Court filed an Order on January 8, 2010 granting the State's Motion to Dismiss both 
cases. The primary issue in both of the Originai Post Conviction Cases was that Petitioner's 
underlying counsel in both the Battery Case and the Drug Case was ineffective as counsel when 
he missed a deadline for filing an appeal in both of the cases. 
COUNT ONE 
Reassertion of Claims Pursuant to Palmer v. Dermitt 
6. Petitioner reasserts via Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 ldaho 591 (Idaho 1981), his claim 
for post-conviction relief because of the ineffective assistance of his underlying criminal counsel, 
SECOND VERIFIED AMENDED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF- 2 -
26 of 109
26 of 109
09-25-'13 15:42 FRCl'1-Hepworth & Assoc. 
.......... 
208-736-0041 T-589 P0007/0011 F-224 
David Pena. as asserted in his Original Post-Conviction Cases, and specifically that David Pena 
filed PetitiOllel"s appeal late after being advised by Petitioner that he wished to file an appeal. 
7. Pursuant to Palmer, Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief in this Count One of 
this matter based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Zollinger. in his Original Post Conviction 
Cases. Specifically, Petitioner alleges: 
a. In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases. Zollinger failed to contact 
Petitioner's underlying criminal attorney, David Pena. to secure infonnalion that Petitioner 
requested Mr. Pena to file an appeal on December 12, 2005. Attached hereto as Exhibit A-A is 
a true and correct letter from the Idaho State Bar. which shows information Zollinger failed to 
obtain. 
b. In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases, l.ollinger failed to contact 
Petitioner's appellate counsel to secure an affidavit or infonnation -&om Erik R. Lehtinen as to 
the events of Petitioner's direct appeal in the underlying cases. Attached hereto as Exhibit B-,..B 
is a true and correct copy of an Affidavit of Erik R. Lehtinen, which shows the infonnation that 
Zollinger failed to obtain. 
c. Zollinger failed to argue information u contmncd in Petitioner's 
Supplemental Brief in Support of Post Conviction Relief. a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as ~hibit C-C; 
d. Zollinger failed to argue distinguishing facts of Petitioner's case from 
Loman Y, State. 138 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2002): namely. that in Loman, the defendant was 
placed on notice within his post-conviction tirneline by the Idaho Supreme Court that the 
defendant•s appeal was untimely filed. when in Petitioner's case, Petitioner had no such notice 
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that his appeal was untimely filed. but instead learned that his appeal was untimely filed only 
after the time for filing his post-conviction had run. 
e. Had Zollinger rendered effective assistance as Petitioner's counsel, by 
completing the acts as stated above, Zollinger would have been able to effectively argue that 
Petitioner was wronged by bis counsel, David Pena, in his underlying criminal cases and would 
have effectively argued against the State's Motion to Dismiss in the Original Post Conviction 
Cases. 
COUNTTWO 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
8. Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief for the 0mg Case in this Count Two of this 
matter based 'd@bo Code§ 19-4901(4). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that there: exists evidence 
of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction of 
sentence in the interest of justice, as follows: 
a. That the State in the Drug Case withheld and suppressed (whether 
inadvertently or not) information that was favorable to Petitioner's defense, thereby creating a 
Brady/Giglio scenario. The infonnation that was specifically withheld and suppressed was that 
several employees, including several forensic experts who testify in court proceedings on a 
regular basis. over a period of several years from 2003 or earlier, to 2011, conspired to maintain 
an ongoing unauthorized quantity of controlled :!lubstances and other chemicals outside the 
practices of the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking or auditing. 
Furthermore, said employees hid said narcotics and chemicals from auditors with the intent to 
deceive. 
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b. A true and correct copy of a letter from a group of prosecutors in the State 
ofldaho to members of the Idaho Bar was filed on February 1, 2012, which contains an 
Administrative Investigation Report by the Idaho State Police, was filed by Petitioner on 
February 1, 2012 as Exhibit XYZ. 
c. It is Petitioner's position that because of the actions of the above-
described employees and the lab report provided by said laboratory in this case, Petitioner was 
prohibited frotn providing a defense in his case that might otherwise be available to him. 
Specifically, Petitioner was prohibited from engaging in appropriate cross-examination of Skylar 
Anderson concerning the above-described violations of laboratory policies and procedures in 
order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity for truthfulness, all in 
violation of the Petitioner's Sixth Amerubnent Constitutional Rights to confront all witnesses 
against him. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief to which Petitioner may be entitled in this 
proceeding, includin& but not limited to the following: 
L That Petitioner be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in the Drug Case and have 
a trial in the Drug Case, 'Whereby he would have the opportunity to cross-examine 
Skylar Anderson. 
2. That the Petitioner be allowed to re-file his Original Post-Conviction Cases and 
argue against the State's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Petitioner further states that the entirety of his claim for successive post conviction 
relief in this case are contained herein. Specifically. Petitioner withdraws any claim for newly 
discovered evidence as it relates to the Drug Case and Laurie Elizabeth Freitag, a.k.a. Laurie 
Morrill. 
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DATED this ~f September, ;013. 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By:~··· 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Wally Schultz, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
That he has read the foregoing Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ~ay of September. 2013. 
NOTAR ~UBLIC FOR ID}\110 
Residing at:~ M)1\1 ..& £i\. 
Commission ~pires: ,\ f\\ 16" \ 
CERTIFICATE or SERVICE 
Steven R. McRae, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the 
'2h,y of September, 2013, he served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
document upon the following: 
Lance Stevenson 
Prosecuting Attorney for 
the County of Minidoka 
P.O. BoxJ68 
Rupert, ID 83350 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail ['X) Facsimile 
~---
Steven R. McRae 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MlNIDOKA 
WALLY K.A .. Y SCHULTZ, Case No. CV-2011-96 
Petitioner~ 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO,-
. Respondent. 
ORDER REGARDING THE 
COURT'S NOTICE OF INTENT 
TO DISMISS AND THE 
PETITIO:NER'S MOTION TO 
AMEND SUCCESSIVE PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICflON 
RELIEF 
PROCEDURALBACKG~OUND 
On September 5, 2013, the court gave notice to the parties of its intent to dismiss 
the Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz's (hereafter "Mr. Schultz") Verified Amended 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. In response, Mr. Schultz filed a Motion to 
Amend Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Reply to Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss. The matter came before the court for a hearing on October 28, 2013, at which 
time the court took the matter under advisement. 
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DISCUSSION 
1. Mr. Schultz's in.effecti'\'e assistallce of counsel claims will not be dismissed at 
this time. 
In the Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post..ConvictionApplication, the court stated its 
intent to dismiss Mr. Schultz's claims of ineffective assistance of oouruiel because he only 
asserted claims against Clayne Zollinger (hereafter "Mr. Zollinger•j. his attorney in his 
two prior post..conviction cases. Since those claims did not constitute legally cognizable 
claims for post-conviction relief, dismissal would have been appropriate. However, lvir. 
Schultz's proposed Second Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief (hereafter "Second Amended Petition") contains claims against his attorney in the 
underlying criminal cases, David Pena (hereafter "Mr. Penaj. lt also contains allegations 
of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding Mr. Zollinger's performance in the prior 
post-conviction cases for the pmpose of allowing the claims against Mr. Pena to be 
presented in a successive petition. See I.C. § 19-4908; Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 
441~ 128 P.3d 975) 978 (Ct.App.2006). 
Sjnce Mr. Schultz bas remedied the defect the court identified in its Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss Post-Conviction Application, Mr. Schultz's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims against Mr. Pena will not be dismissed at this time pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 19-4906(b). 
2. Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and misconduct at 
the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory are. dismissed. 
In the Notice oflntent to Dismiss Post-Conviction Applicatiollt the court stated its 
intent to dismiss Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and 
misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory for a variety of reasons. Mr. 
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Schultz's made no amendments to these claims in his proposed Second Amended 
Petition. 
For the reasons stated in the court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post-Conviction 
Applicatio~ Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and misconduct 
at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory are dismissed. 
3. Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief is granted in part and denied in part. 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether to allow the amendment of 
pleadings. See Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trost, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,247 P.3d 620 
(20 I 0). The court perceives the issue as a matter of discretion. The court exercises that 
discretion within the bollllds provided by the following legal authority. 
After a responsive pleading has been filed and the case has been set for 1rial, "a 
party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given whenjustice so requires." I.R.C.P. IS(a). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held: 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason--such as undue 
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously 
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.--the 
leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. 
Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 612, 114 P.3d 974, 982 (2005) 
(quoting Carl R Christensen Family Trust 11. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P .2d 
1197, 1202 (1999)). 
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Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend is granted .in part. Mr. Schultz is permitted. to 
amend the petition in this case regarding his claims of in.effective assistance of counsel 
against Mr. Pena (Count One in the proposed Second Amended Petition). 
Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend is denied in part. As set forth above, the court 
dismissed Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and misconduct at 
the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory. Therefore, no purpose is served by allowing 
these claims (Count Two in the proposed Second Amended Petition) to remain in the 
amended pleading. 
ORDER 
The court enters the following order in this case: 
(1) Mr. Schultz's ineffective assistance of counsel claims will not be 
dismissed at this time. 
(2) Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and 
misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory are dismissed. 
(3) Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief is granted in part and denied in part. Amendment is permitted as to Count One of 
the proposed Second Amended Petition. Leave to amend is denied as to Count Two. Mr. 
Schultz is permitted to file an amended petition consistent with this Order by the 
close of business on November 8, 2013. /4 
It is so ORDERED this ). "/ day of October, LJ~ 
MlCHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the l of Nov,eiw.Lv1 ~ 2013, I served a true, 
· correct copy of the ORDER REGARDING THE COURT'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
AND THE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO AMEND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF upon the following in the manner provided: 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
P. 0. Box368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
lstevenson@co.minidoka.id.us 
Steven R. McRae 
P. 0. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com 
( ) First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery- Basket 
WEmail 
( ) First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket 
('ftmail 
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Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984] 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
121 3rd Ave. East 
Jerome, ID 83338 
Telephone No. (208) 324-7200 
Facsimile No. (208) 324-7206 
e-mail: SMcRae@Magic Valley Legal.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Case No. CR-2011-96 
SECOND VERIFIED AMENDED 
SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Wally Kay Schultz, by and through his attorney of record, 
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and submits this Second Amended Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief. 
Petitioner alleges: 
1. The Petitioner is currently detained in the Idaho Correctional Center. 
2. The underlying offenses in this matter are from Minidoka cases CR-2005-884 (the 
"Drug Case") and CR-2005-1139 (the "Battery Case"). Convictions in these matters occurred in 
the Fifth Judicial District of Minidoka County, Rupert, Idaho. Petitioner seeks to consolidate 
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both of these cases into one post-conviction case for the purposes of expediency and judicial 
economy and because the claim of Count One as contained herein is the same for both cases. 
3. In the Drug Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, I.C. § 37-2732(C)(l). Sentence was imposed on 
December 15, 2005, and the Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate period of incarceration of 
3 years and an indetem1inate period of incarceration of 4 years. 
4. In the Battery Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of 
Battery, l.C. § 18-903. Sentence was imposed on December l5, 2005, and the Petitioner was 
sentenced to a determinate period of incarceration of 5 years and an indeterminate period of 
incarceration of 5 years. 
5. Petitioner sought post conviction relief in each of the Drug Case and the Battery 
Case in Minidoka County Case Nos. CV-2009-221 and CV-2009-47, respectively (the "Original 
Post Conviction Cases"). In both of the Original Post Conviction Cases, Petitioner was 
represented by counsel, Clayne S. Zollinger, Jr. ("Zollinger"). In the Original Post Conviction 
Cases, the Court filed an Order on January 8, 2010 granting the State's Motion to Dismiss both 
cases. The primary issue in both of the Original Post Conviction Cases was that Petitioner"s 
underlying counsel in both the Battery Case and the Drug Case was ineffective as counsel when 
he missed a deadline for filing an appeal in both of the cases. 
COUNT ONE 
Reassertion of Claims Pursuant to Palmer v. Dermitt 
6. Petitioner reasserts via Palmer v. Dermifl, I 02 Idaho 591 (Idaho 1981 ), his claim 
for post-conviction relief because of the ineffective assistance of his underlying criminal counsel, 
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David Pena, as asserted in his Original Post-Conviction Cases, and specifically that David Pena 
filed Petitioner's appeal late after being advised by Petitioner that he wished to file an appeal. 
7. Pursuant to Palmer, Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief in this Count One of 
this matter based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Zollinger, in his Original Post Conviction 
Cases. Specifically, Petitioner alleges: 
a. In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases, Zollinger failed to contact 
Petitioner's underlying criminal attorney, David Pena, to secure information that Petitioner 
requested Mr. Pena to file an appeal on December 12, 2005. Attached hereto as Exhibit A-A is 
a true and correct letter from the Idaho State Bar, which shows information Zollinger failed to 
obtain. 
b. In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases, Zollinger failed to contact 
Petitioner's appeHate counsel to secure an affidavit or information from Erik R. Lehtinen as to 
the events of Petitioner's direct appeal in the underlying cases. Attached hereto as Exhibit B-B 
is a true and correct copy of an Affidavit of Erik R. Lehtinen, which shows the information that 
Zollinger failed to obtain. 
c. Zollinger failed to argue information as contained in Petitioner·s 
Supplemental Brief in Support of Post Conviction Relief, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C-C. 
d. Zollinger failed to argue distinguishing facts of Petitioner's case from 
Loman v. State, 138 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2002): namely, that in Loman, the defendant was 
placed on notice within his post-conviction timeline by the Idaho Supreme Court that the 
defendant's appeal was untimely filed, when in Petitioner's case, Petitioner had no such notice 
SECOND VERIFIED AMENDED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF- 3 -
39 of 109
39 of 109
that his appeal was untimely filed, but instead learned that his appeal was untimely filed only 
after the time for filing his post-conviction had run. 
e. Had Zollinger rendered effective assistance as Petitioner's counsel, by 
completing the acts as stated above, Zollinger would have been able to effectively argue that 
Petitioner was wronged by his counsel, David Pena, in his underlying criminal cases and would 
have effectively argued against the State's Motion to Dismiss in the Original Post Conviction 
Cases. 
COUNT TWO 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
8. Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief for the Drug Case in this Count Two of this 
matter based Idaho Code§ 19-4901(4). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that there exists evidence 
of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction of 
sentence in the interest of justice, as follows: 
a. That the State in the Drug Case withheld and suppressed (whether 
inadvertently or not) information that was favorable to Petitioner's defense, thereby creating a 
Brady/Giglio scenario. The information that was specifically withheld and suppressed was that 
several employees, including several forensic experts who testify in court proceedings on a 
regular basis, over a period of several years from 2003 or earlier, to 20 I I, conspired to maintain 
an ongoing unauthorized quantity of controlled substances and other chemicals outside the 
practices of the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking or auditing. 
Furthermore, said employees hid said narcotics and chemicals from auditors with the intent to 
deceive. 
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b. A true and correct copy of a letter from a group of prosecutors in the State 
ofldaho to members of the Idaho Bar was filed on February I, 2012, which contains an 
Administrative Investigation Report by the Idaho State Police, was filed by Petitioner on 
Febntary I, 2012 as Exhibit XYZ. 
c. [tis Petitioner's position that because of the actions of the above-
described employees and the lab report provided by said laboratory in this case, Petitioner was 
prohibited from providing a defense in his case that might otherwise be available to him. 
Specifically, Petitioner was prohibited from engaging in appropriate cross-examination of Skylar 
Anderson concerning the above-described violations of laboratory policies and procedures in 
order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity for truthfulness, all in 
violation of the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Constitutional Rights to confront all witnesses 
against him. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief to which Petitioner may be entitled in this 
proceeding, including, but not limited to the following: 
I. That Petitioner be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in the Drug Case and have 
a trial in the Drug Case, whereby he would have the opportunity to cross-examine 
Skylar Anderson. 
2. That the Petitioner be allowed to re-file his Original Post-Conviction Cases and 
argue against the State's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Petitioner further states that the entirety of his claim for successive post conviction 
relief in this case are contained herein. Specifically, Petitioner withdraws any claim for newly 
discovered evidence as it relates to the Drug Case and Laurie Elizabeth Freitag, a.k.a. Laurie 
Morrill. 
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DATED this ~f September, ;013, 
°-' - > 
McRAE.LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By:.~· 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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STA TE OF IDAHO 
County of ""':ti>~\\./CcJQp 
) 
)ss. 
) 
Wally Schultz, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as fol1ows: 
That he has read the foregoing Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ~ay of September, 20l3. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
• Steven R. McRae, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the 
1 '1~ctay of Ne/~bl(, 2013, he served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
document upon the following: 
Lance Stevenson 
Prosecuting Attorney for 
the County of Minidoka 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
{X] Facsimile 
Steven R. McRae 
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MINIDOKA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
STATE OF IDAHO 
LANCE D. STEVENSON, Prosecuting Attorney //SB #7733/ 
ALAN GOODMAN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney //SB #2778/ 
ROBERTS. HEMSLEY, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney //SB #7955/ 
715 G. Street, P. 0. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
Office: (208)436-7187 
Facsimile: (208) 436-3177 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF IDAHO 
FILED.DISTRICT COURT 
. . CASE# _____ _ 
t; TIME._---\i,..;..;:~3~~::c+------·---
J~>~~; :·-. 
NOV 2 6 2013 ?'- _--:-: . ·:· .. : :~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFfH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
MAGISTRATE COURT 
WALLY K. SCHULTZ, 
Petitioner, 
. vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-2011-96 
) 
) 
) ANSWER TO SECOND VERIFIED 
) AMENDED SUCCESSIVE PETfflON 
) FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Robert S. Hemsley, 
Minidoka County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby answer the 
Petitioner's ("Schultz") Second Verified Amended Petition for post-conviction relief 
in the above-entitled action as follows: 
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I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TOW ALLY K. SCHULTZ'S POST-CONVICTION 
ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Schultz are denied by the state unless specifically 
admitted herein. 
II. 
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO SCHULTZ'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
Answering paragraph one (1) ofSchultz's Second Verified Amended Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent denies the allegations contained therein. 
Answering paragraphs two (2) through four (4) of Schultz's Second Verified 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the allegations 
contained therein. 
Answering paragraph 5 (five) of Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the f"mt three sentences from that 
paragraph, but at this point, Respondent lacks sufficient information upon which to 
base an answer to the fourth and f"mal sentence of paragraph S, and so denies the 
claim. Respondent resen-es the right to amend this answer upon further 
investigation. 
Answering COUNT ONE, paragraphs six (6), seven (7) (a), (b), (c), (d) and 
(e) of Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition for Post-conviction Relief, 
Respondent denies the allegation contained therein. 
Answering COUNT TWO, paragraphs eight (8) (a), (b) and (c), of Schultz's 
Second Verified Amended Petition for Post Com.iction Relief, Respondent denies 
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which involve newly discovered evidence, were dismissed by the Court's Order filed 
on October 31, 2013, and the fact that such allegations were resubmitted in this 
Second Verified Amended Petition is inconsistent with that Order. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition fails to state any grounds upon 
which relief can be granted as his claims are both uncognizable and legally 
insufficient. Idaho Code§ 19-490l(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition contains bare and conclusory 
allegations and therefore fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code 
§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition is untimely under the 
appropriate statute of limitations. Idaho Code § 19-4902. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition is an improper successive 
petition. Idaho Code § 19-4908. 
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WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Schultz's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That Schultz's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed; 
c) For such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the 
case. 
DATED this :J£._ day of November 2013. 
Ro~~-----~~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
T . 'i ,_ rJJ' d I HEREBY CER IFY that on this c- l'1 ay of November, 2013, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Steven McCrae 
P.O. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
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Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984] 
McRAE LAW OFFICE; PLLC 
P.O. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755 
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041 
e-mail: SMcRae@Magic Valley Legal .com 
Attorney for Petitio11er 
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT 
CASE#~~~~~-
TIME l :35~"&:: 
JAN O 2 2GH 
TEMPLE, CLERK 
~~~~-~·DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, TN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY K. SCHULTZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
\ ) 
) 
Case No. CV-2011-96 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
_______________ ) 
COMBS NOW, Petitioner Wally K. Schultz, by and through his attorney of record, 
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Response 10 Respondent's Motion 
For Summary Judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matter. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-C-0nviction Relief on January 21. 2011. After being 
dismissed on September 13, 2012, Petitioner filed an appeal. On July 31, 20 l3, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals reversed the September 13, 201?, dismissal and a .temittitur was issued on August 23, 
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2013. The case was re-opened and the Court issued a Notice to Dismiss Post-Conviction 
application on September 5, 2013. On October 31, 2013, the Court issued an Order dismissing 
all claims except those regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. A second Verified Amended 
Successive Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief was filed October 31, 2013. The State filed an 
answer on November 26, 2013. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Respondent is incorr~ct in asserting that the Petitioner's claim is procedurally barred 
because th1;.· Respondenf s request for summary dismissal is based on a faulty reading of Idaho 
Code§ 19-4908. Petitioner's Count I is for post-conviction relief based on the failure of post-
conviction counsel Clayne S. Zollinger (Zollinger) to investigate ineffective assistance of 
Petitioner's ·underlying criminal counsel, David Pena. Zollinger's failure included the failure to 
obtain information from the Idaho State Bar favorable to the Petitionei, failure to secure an 
affidavit, failure to argue for post-conviction reliet: failure to distinguish negative case law, and 
failure to infonn Petitioner of option to appeal. Before addressing Respondent's grounds for 
dismissal. a quick review of post.· conviction summary dismissal standards is appropriatt.:. 
(1). Post-Conviction Sum.nuu'Y Dismissal StllDdards 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently outlined post-conviction law. Ridgley v. State, 148 
Idaho 671. 674 227 P.3d 925 (Idaho 2010). Post~conviction proceedings are governed by the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, LC. § 19-4901 et seq. A petition for post-conviction 
relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Ridgley at 674. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, 
either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own initiative. Id. at 675. 
"Stunmary dismissal of a post-conviction application is the procedural equivalent of summary 
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judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.'1 State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). 
When reviewing the grant of a 1notion for swnmary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Ridgley at 675. Therefore, when a 
court examines an issue for dismissal, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
e:l'.ists based on the p!e-adings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. Id. 
For purposes of considering a swnmary dismissal motion, an applicant's unoontroverted 
factual allegations contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits 
are deemed to be true. Hayes v. StateJ 195 P.3d 712, 146 Idaho 353 (Idaho App. 2008} (intemal 
citations omitted). The court will detennine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings. depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally 
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Kelly v. State, 149 
Idaho 517. 521. 236 P.3d 1277 (2010). 
(2). Petitioner's elaim is not procedurally bared. 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 stat.cs that "[a]II grounds for relief available to an applicant under 
thfa at must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended applk:ation. •• Id. If a claim is not 
raised it c:annot be tbe basis for a subsequent application "unicss the court finds a ground for 
relief which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental 01· amended application.•• 
Respondent's first ground for summary judgment is a blanket statement that Petitioner 
did not assert his Count One claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the original, 
supplementalt or amended application ... " Respondent's Mot. For Surnm. Dism. and Brief in 
Supp. (hereinafter Respondent's Mot) pg. S. Respondent's claim is odd in light of their Motion. 
On page two (2)> Respondent writes that Petitioner filed a post-conviction claim in 2009 stating 
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that Petitioner "alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.'' This sentence is 
Respondent agreeing that Petitioner alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his 
original post-conviction complain in 2009. Because the original post-conviction complaint 
included a claim for ineffective assistance of cowisel, then Idaho Code § 19-4908 would not 
prohibit a subsequent post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Furthermore, the 2011 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is being asserted against 
Petitioners postycon;.-iction counsel Clayne S. Zollinger (Zollinger} which could not have been 
brought in the 2009 post-conviction complaint because Zollingcr's ineffective assistance of 
counsel had not yet occurred. Finally~ in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981), the Court 
clearly established that when a post-conviction attorney fails to bring all post-conviction claims 
or fails to adequately assert the post,conviction petitioner's claims, a subsequent post-conviction 
attorney can assert the claims that the original wunsel failed to bring or bring the inadequately 
asserted claims to appropriate conclusion. Here, Idaho Code § 19-4908 simply does not apply. 
(3). Petitioner is within the reasonable time to assert his post-conviction claims 
because the daim was not known until 2011. 
The Respondent's second argument - that Petitioner failed to fik his subsequent pot!.t-
conviction petition inside of time limitations - seems to be misplaced. First, Respondent 
argwnents are entirely unclear. It appears that Respondent is arguing that the present post-
conviction case (CV-2011-96) was untimely brought. As such, Petitioner wiJI only respond to 
this argum1:nt. 
Idaho Code § 19-4902 creates a one-year (plus forty-two (42) days for appeal) statutory 
guideline for the assertion of any known post-conviction claims. However, when an wtlcnown 
claim is brought to the attention of a petitioner, the petitioner has a ''reasonable time" in which to 
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bring the new post-conviction claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905 (2007). The first 
part of this inquiry is when a petitioner discovers the previously unknown claim. Id. at 905. 
Second, the 0 reasonable time" is not based on a specific date or number scheme. Id. The 
Supreme Court held that a "reasonable time" is to be detennined case-by-case based on the 
unique facts of a case. Id. 
Here, Respondent fails to satisfy the first step in stating that Petitioner did not file his 
subsequent post•conviction petition within a "rcssonable tin1s". Step one of the "reasonable 
time" inquiry demands that Respondent factually establish when Petitioner was aware of the 
inefiective assistance of Zollinger. However, Respondent simply repeatedly refers to filings 
completed in 2008. Respondent's Mot. pg. 7. Yet; what Respondent does not articulate is how 
the legal documents filed in 2008 would have made Petitioner aware of the ineffective assistance 
of counsel that would. occur in 2009 by Zolling~r - i.e., that Zollinger was not adequataly 
proceeding on Petitioner's claim against David Pena. 
To be clear, Petitioner's claim in Count One of the Second Verified Amended Successive 
Petiiion for Post Conviction Relief is based upon Palmer v, D:!rmitt, as explained above. This 
claim states that Clayne Zoliinger faiied to adequately investigate a..YJ.d bring Pclitioner's claim in 
his original post-conviction proceeding (Minidoka County Case No. CV-2009-221). Petitioner 
brought thls claim on January 21, 2011, which was actually before the remittitur was filed on 
CV-2009-2011 on August 8, 20 l 1. In fact, Petitioner filed the present post-conviction case only 
thirteen (13) days after the Court granted the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in CV-2009-
221, which was when Petitioner learned of Zollinger's failure to adequately bring his post-
conviction daiin. 
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In this case, with the facts construed in light most favorable to Petitioner. Respondent has 
failed to satisfy the high standards for summary judgment. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that this Court deny Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matter. 
DA TED this 2nd day of January. 2013. 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
?]~····, By:'"-J~--~_..-·---·· 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of January 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the following: 
Lance Stevenson, Minidoka Prosecuting Attorney [ ] 
P.O. Box 368 [ ] 
Rupert, ID 83350 [ ] 
Fax: (208) 436·3 l n [ x] 
Steven R. McRae 
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STATE Of IDAHO 
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ROBERTS. HEMSLEY, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (1SB#7955/ 
715 G. Street, P. 0. Box 368 
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AITORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FILED-DISTRICT COURT 
CASE# 
---:------
TIME ____ J ~ '5 (av, 
JAN O 7 20i4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY K. SCHULTZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-2011-96 
) 
) 
) REPLY TO PETITIONER'S 
) RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Respondent, by and through Robert S. Hemsley, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Minidoka County, and respectfully submits this Reply to 
Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
Reply to Section (2) of the Petitioner's Response 
In Section (2) of the petitioner's response, he argues that the State has relied on a 
"faulty reading ofldaho Code § 19-4908," which reads as follows: "[a]ll grounds for relief 
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended 
Reply to Petitioner's Response To 
State's Motion For Summary Dismissal 1 
55 of 109
55 of 109
application. Any ground ... not so raised ... may not be the basis for a subsequent application, 
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or 
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." 
The clear language of that statute indicates that the issue before the Court here is that 
any claims brought in this successive post-conviction petition should have been raised in the 
original petition. If they were not, they are barred by LC. §19-4908 unless there was a 
"sufficient reason" for which they were not t5serted. Some confusion of this issue is evident in 
the petitioner's response where he argues that he in fact did raise his Count I claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel-as currently pied in this case-in the original petition; he 
argued that "[b]ecause the original post-conviction complaint included a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, then Idaho Code § 19-4908 would not prohibit a subsequent post-
conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel." 
If the claim currently before the Court were properly asserted in the original post-
conviction petition, then it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata by the summary dismissal of 
the original application and subsequent affirmation of that summary dismissal by the appellate 
court. If the petitioner would like to concede this fact as he argues in his response, it would 
create another basis for summary dismissal. 
However, as is clearly evident from the procedural history relevant to this successive 
petition as well as the appellate opinion dismissing the original petitions (See Schultz v. State, 
151 Idaho 383, at 387 (Ct.App.2011), the petitioner has not previously and properly pied this 
particular claim asserted in Count One of the Second Verified Amended Successive Petition for 
Post-conviction. Thus, the claim is procedurally barred unless the Court determines there is 
"sufficient reason" for which it was not raised. 
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Reply to Section (3) of the Petitioner's Response 
In his response, the petitioner confuses the separate claims of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel and post-conviction counsel, and each distinct ineffective assistance claim's 
relevance to this motion for summary dismissal. In reply to the argument that the petitioner has 
brought this successive post-conviction claim within a "reasonable time" as·required by the 
analysis of "sufficient reason" to file a successive petition pursuant to I. C. § 19-4908, is it 
necessary to separate the two distinct ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the relief that 
they can provide. 
First, his claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel-that of Mr. 
Zollinger-can only be a basis for determining whether there is "sufficient reason" for filing a 
successive petition, not as a basis for post-conviction relief. (See this Court's discussion in its 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post-conviction Application filed on September 5, 2013, p. 4-6.) 
Second, the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel-that of Mr. Pena-can only be 
asserted as a basis for post-conviction relief in a successive petition if the Court finds "sufficient 
reason" for allowing the successive petition under I.C. § 19-4908. 
Whether this successive petition was filed within a "reasonable time" is dependent upon 
when the petitioner became aware of the basis for post-conviction relief, and here the only claim 
that is potentially proper for post-conviction relief is the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
Mr. Pena, and his failure to file a timely appeal. Thus the relevant inquiry for a ''reasonable 
time" is into when the petitioner became aware of Mr. Pena's ineffective assistance of counsel 
(November 24, 2008) and the time he filed this successive post-conviction petition (January 21, 
2011), not when the petitioner first became aware of the alleged ineffective assistance of Mr. 
Zollinger. 
Reply to Petitioner's Response To 
State's Motion For Summary Dismissal 3 
57 of 109
57 of 109
The petitioner attempts to confuse the issue by arguing that the "reasonable time" 
inquiry "demands that Respondent factually establish when Petitioner was aware of the 
ineffective assistance of Zollinger." However, the State's position is that Mr. Zollinger' s 
involvement only becomes relevant if this Court first determines that this successive petition 
was filed within a "reasonable time" of when the petitioner became aware of Mr. Pena's alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel. If the Court determines that it was not filed within a 
"reasonable time/' then the petition must be summarily dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. If 
however, the Court determines that the successive petition was filed within a ''reasonable time," 
then the inquiry properly becomes whether the alleged ineffective assistance of Mr. Zollinger 
during the prior post-conviction proceedings is "sufficient reason" for not asserting the 
allegation of Mr. Pena's ineffective assistance in the original petition, and therefore would 
allow the filing of this successive petition. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the proper time period to consider for the 
"reasonable time" inquiry were the delay between the point the petitioner became aware of Mr. 
Zollinger's alleged ineffective assistance and the time he filed this successive petition, this 
successive petition would still be untimely. The petitioner claims in his latest iteration of the 
successive petition that had Mr. Zollinger rendered effective assistance of counsel, then he 
would have been able to effectively argue against the state's motion to summarily dismiss the 
prior post-conviction cases, and prevent the prior cases from being summarily dismissed. If the 
prior post-conviction cases were summarily dismissed because of the ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel as petitioner alleges, then the petitioner became aware of the alleged 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel on January 8, 2010, when those cases were 
summarily dismissed. Thus, on January 21, 2011, this successive petition was filed over one 
year after the petitioner became aware of his ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
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claims and over two years after he became aware of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claims. The petitioner is completely mistaken on page five of his response when he argues that 
he filed this successive petition only thirteen days after the prior post-conviction cases were 
dismissed; it was filed one year and thirteen days later as the prior petitions were dismissed on 
January 8, 2010, not in 2011. 
The petitioner also alludes to the filing of the remittitur in the prior post-conviction case 
on August 8, 2011 as relevant to the determination of whether this successive petition was filed 
within a "reasonable time." If the petitioner wants to justify his delay in filing this successive 
petition because he was waiting for the appeal in the prior cases to become final, it is a 
disingenuous attempt for two reasons. First, pursuant to the case law explained in the State's 
motion for summary dismissal and also here below, the proper inquiry is when he became aware 
of the claim, not when any appellate proceedings became final. Second, the petitioner did not in 
fact wait for the appellate opinion or remittitur to be filed; he filed this untimely successive 
petition months before either of those documents were even filed by the appellate court. 
Given this procedural history, pursuant to Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 191-92, 177 
P.3d 400, 405-06 (Ct. App. 2008), this successive petition was not filed within a "reasonable 
time." The Schwartz case stated as follows: 
On May 3, 2005, the district court denied Schwartz's motion to extend the filing 
time based on attorney Parrish's admitted failure to file an initial application 
within the limitation period. Schwartz was informed at that time that her letter 
and subsequent filings had not extended the limitation period and that the district 
court would not grant her an extension of time to file an initial application. 
Schwartz, however, waited until April 26, 2006--almost twelve months--to mail 
an application alleging that ineffective assistance of her appointed post-
conviction counsel was the reason that she had not timely filed an initial 
application.5 We can perceive ofno sufficient reason why it took Schwartz 
almost twelve months to file this application. 
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Id Our case is very similar because the original petitions in this case were summarily 
dismissed by this district Court on the basis that they were untimely, and in Schwartz, the 
district court denied a request for a time extension to file an initial application: both were 
disposed of on the basis of being untimely. Furthermore, the petitioner in this case, like 
Schwartz, claims that the original petitions were dismissed because of the ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel. The distinction between the cases, however, is in the fact that the 
petitioner here actually waited longer to file the successive post-conviction application than did 
the petitioner in Schwartz. Whether the Court analyzes the timeliness of this successive filing 
based on the discovery of the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, or the discovery of 
the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, this petition was not filed within a 
''reasonable time." 
The Court of Appeals statement from its affirmation of the summary dismissals of the 
petitioner's prior post-conviction application is equally applicable here: "[t]hat Schultz chose 
not to file his post-conviction petitions earlier because he was under the mistaken belief that the 
law allowed him more time to file, does not equate, as Schultz contends, to a deprivation of any 
reasonable opportunity to do so. Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,387,256 P.3d 791, 795 (Ct. 
App.2011). 
Additional Basis For Summary Dismissal 
The following additional basis for summary dismissal is raised here for the first time, 
therefore, the petitioner should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond if he so chooses. 
If the Court determines that this successive petition was timely filed, the petitioner is 
still not entitled to relief. The original petitions for post-conviction relief were summarily 
dismissed because they were not timely. Even had Mr. Zollinger done everything that the 
petitioner alleges he should have, the prior petitions would still have been untimely and subject 
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to smnmary dismissal. There is nothing post-conviction counsel, who was appointed after 
Schultz filed those initial petitions, could have done to have them filed earlier, it is a factual 
impossibility. 
The petitioner claims in Count One paragraph 7.d. and e. of the petition that had Mr. 
Zollinger argued distinguishing facts of the petitioner's case from those in Loman v. State, 138 
Idaho 1 (Ct.App.2002), the prior post-conviction cases would not have been summarily 
dismissed. The prior post-conviction cases are not distinguishable from Loman. There is 
sufficient information in the record for the Court to make the determination in this case, even if 
Mr. Zollinger had or had not done everything the petitioner has alleged, that it would not have 
changed the outcome of this Court's prior summary dismissal based on the untimely filing of 
the original post-conviction petitions. The fact that the petitioner's prior prose post-conviction 
filings were untimely was completely beyond the control of Mr. Zollinger. Even had Mr. 
Zollinger gained the Court's permission to properly plead the petitioner's claim against Mr. 
Pena, the petition was still untimely and would have been dismissed. 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing discussion, as well as the State's Motion For Summary 
Dismissal, the State respectfully requests that the petition and all of its claims be summarily 
dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 19-4906(c) and 19-4908. 
DATED this .J_day of-----"'":-,L.<.J,4-,u-'---_u_._A_fl.,_,_y _ ---'2014. 
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in the United States mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to: 
Steven McCrae 
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Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
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Case No. CV-2011~96 
STIPUL.\TION TO VACATE 
HEARING 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Wally K. Schuitz, by and through his aitom.ey of record. 
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and Robert S. Hemsley, attorney for State of 
Idaho, and stipulate to vacate the hearing currentiy scheduled for January 17. 2014 at 1:30 p.m. 
in order to allow the Petitioner adequate time to answer State's "Additional Basis for Summary 
Dismissal .. as stated b:1 the State's Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. 
DATED this 'fJ'-_ day offanuary, 2014. 
Stipulation to Vacate Hearing 
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Steven R. McRae 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY K. SCHULTZ, 
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vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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Case No. CV-2011-96 
PETITIONER,S RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT,S ADDITIONAL BASIS 
F'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Petitioner Wally K. Schultz, by and through his attorney of record, 
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Response to Re~pondent's 
Additional Basis For Summary Judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matt.er. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGR.OUND 
Petitioner filed a Petition foe Post-Conviction Relief on January 21, 2011. After being 
dismissed on September 13, 2012, Petitioner filed an appeal. On July 31, 2013, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals reversed the September 13, 2012, dismissal and a remittitur was issued on August 23, 
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2013. The case was re-opened and the Court issued a Notice to Dismiss Post-Conviction 
application on September 5, 2013. On October 31, 2013, the Court issued an Order dismissing 
all claims except those regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. A second Verified Amended 
Successive Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief was filed October 31, 2013. The State filed an 
answer on November 26, 2013. On December 12, 2013, the State filed a Motion Jot Summa,:i,• 
Dismissal. Petitioi1er responded to the A.fotionfor Summmy Dismissal on Jmmary 2, 2014. On 
January 7, 2014, the: state responded to Petitioner and made an additional claim for summary 
dismissal, which brings us to t'1is response. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The State has failed to show why the original petition for post-conviction relief does not 
comport with the "reasonable time" standard as created by the Idaho Supreme Court. Before 
addressing the State's new gronnd for sununary dismissal, a review of the post-conviction 
summary dismissal standard is appropriate. 
(1). Post-Conviction Summary Dismissal Standards 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently outlined post-conviction law. Ridgley v. State, 148 
Idaho 671, 674 227 P.3d 925 (Idaho 2010). Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code § 19-4901 et seq. A petition for post-
conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Ridgley 
at 674. Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief: either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own initiative. ld. 
at 675. "Summary dismissal of a post-conviction application is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." State v. Yakovac. 145 ldaho 437,444, 180 P.3d 476,483 
(2008). When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies . the 
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same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Ridgley at 675. Therefore, when 
a court exrunines an issue for dismissal, the court must detennine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. Id. 
For purposes of considering a summary dismissal motion, an applicant's uncontroverted 
factual allegations contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits 
are deemed to be true. Hayes v. Staff:, 195 P.3d 712, 146 Idaho 353 (Idaho App. 2008) (internal 
citations omitted). The Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings. depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally 
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Kelly v. State, 149 
Idaho 517, S21, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010). 
(2). Petitioner's claim is not procedurally bared. 
The State now asserts that Petitioner's claims should be bared pursuant to Idaho Code § 
19-4902. According to Idaho Code § 19-4902, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed 
''at any time within one (I) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the 
determination of an appeal." Loman v. State. 138 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2002). However, the Courts 
have recognized an exception to the time limits established in Idaho Code § 19-4902. When an 
unknown claim is brought to the attention of a petitioner, the petitioner has a ''reasonable time'' 
in which to bring the newly discovered post-conviction claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 ldaho 
900, 905 (2007). There aze two pa11s in determining the legal meaning of "reasonable time." 
See Id. The first part of the inquiry is to establish when a petitioner discovers the previously 
unknown claim. Id. at 905. The second part of the inquiry establishes whether an individual 
flied a petition for post-conviction relief within a reasonable time period upon learning of the 
new evidence. In detcm1ining a ''reasonable time" the Court does not look at a specific date or 
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number scheme; rather, the "reasonable time" standard can only be determined by analyzing the 
unique facts on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
Here, as in the fi1·st Motion for Summary Judgment, the State fails to satisfy the first step 
of the "rersonable time" inquiry. Step (me of the "reasonable time" inquiry demands that the 
State factually establish when Petitioner was aware of the ineffective assistance of counsel. 
However, the State presents no facts establishing the date when Petitioner was aware that Mr. 
Pena had failed to file a timely appeal. Indeed, the State presents no supporting facts at all. 
As Petitioner had requested that Mr. Pena file an appeal, Petitioner was patiently awaiting 
the result of the appeal before proceeding with a petition for post-conviction reliet: Petitioner's 
appeal was being handled by Erik Lehtinen of the State Appellate Public Defenders Office. As 
shown by Exhibit B-B, which is attached to this answer and to the Amended Petition in this case, 
Mr. Lehtinw conti11~1ally assured Petitioner that there was n<> need to file a post-conviction 
petition until the appeal was detem1ined. Affidavit of Erik R Lehtinen ~ 23, 28, 29. Mr. 
Lehtinen continued to inform Petitioner from July of 2006 until September of 2008 that he 
needed to wait to fik a petition for post-conviction relief until the appeals case was concluded. 
Id. However, in September of2008 Mr. Lehtinen fully reviewed Petitioner's appeal and realized 
that the appeal was likely untimely. Id. at ~ 43. Mr. Lehtinen, realizing the gravity of the 
situation~ informed petitioner of the immediate need to file a petition for post-conviction relief. 
Jd. Upon receiving this coW1Sel from Mr. Lehtinen, Petitioner filed his first post-conviction 
petition in January of 2009. 
Petitioner was informed for the first time of Mr. Pena's untimely appeal in September of 
2008. The.refore, Petitioner,s "reasonable time,, clock would begin on September of 2008, when 
he became awmse of Mr. Pena's terrible error. Here. the State has presented no evidence showing 
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that Petitioner was aware, prior to September 2008, of the ineffoctive counsel due to Mr. Pena1s 
failure to file an appeal. Indeed. the affidavit of Mr. Lehtinen plainly shows that Petitioner was 
unaware of the untimely nature of the appeal u11til late 2008. In addition, whereas Petitioner 
filed his first post-co1wiction petitioner in January of 2009, the State has faile.d to show why the 
passage of three (3) months would not be a reasonable time period. for an incarcerated individual 
to file a petition with the Court. 
Furthem1ore, as set forth in the Amended Successive Petiti(Jn for Post-Conviction Relief. 
the original post-co1wiction tiled would not have been dismissed, had Clayne Zollinger fulfilled 
his duty of due diligence. Because Clayne Zollinger did not obtain Mr. Lehtinen's affidavit, 
Clayne Zollinger did not know the factual and legal basis why Petitioner was well within bis 
right to file a petition for post-convicti011 relief after statutory time passed. Finally, in Palmer v. 
Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981), the Court clearly established that when a post-conviction 
attorney fails to bring all post-conviction claims, a subsequent post-conviction attorney can 
assert the claims that the original counsel failed to bring. Here, Mr. Zollinger failed to provide 
effective assistance of counsel by not researching the mistakes of Mr. Lehtinen. This was a 
failure to bring all post-conviction claims. Now, Petitioner's Counsel is asserting the claims that 
original counsel failed to bring. 
In this case, with the facts construed in light most favorable to Petitioner, the State has 
failed to satisfy the demanding standards for summary judgment. 
UL CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that this Court deny the State's addition 
grounds for sununary judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matter. 
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DATED this 29th day of .January, 2014. 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By:.%8~ 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '29 _ day of"J)))W4Yl~ 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the foil wing: 
Lance Stevenso11, Minidoka Prosecuting Attorney [ ] 
P.O. Box 368 [ ] 
Rupert, ID 83350 [ ] 
Fax.: (208) 436-3177 [ x ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
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AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IOAHO l 
ss 
COUNTY OF ADA 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says; 
(1) I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho; 
(2) I am presently employed by the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
{"SAPD") as a Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, and have been so 
employed for some six and one-half years; 
(3) In my capacity as a Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, I represented 
Wally Kay Schultz In the consolidated direct appeal of his convictions in 
Minidoka County Case Nos. CR-2005-884 (the "Drug Case") and CR~ 
2005~ 1135 (the "Battery Case"), which were denominated Supreme Court 
Nos. 33255 and 33256, respectively, on appeal; 
( 4) I also currentty represent Mr. Schultz in a consolidated post-conviction 
appeal (Supreme Court Case Nos. 37370 and 37371} arising out of the 
summary dismissal of post-conviction petitions arising out ot the 
aforementioned criminal convictions; 
· (5) All matters set forth herein are based on my review of the records on 
appeal In the above-referenced cases, my review of the records of the 
SAPD, and my personal knowledge: 
(6) "fhe purpose of this affidavit is to set forth an accurate and complete 
timeline of events conceroing Mr. Schultz's ability to have known that his 
consolidated direct appeal may have been untimely filed and, therefore, 
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the one·year statute of limitation for filing his petition(s) for post-con
viction 
reltef was not automatically tolled pursuant to tC. § 19-4902(a); 
(7) In August of 2005, following a jury trial, Mr. Schultz was found guilty 
in the 
Battery Case; 
(8) On December 12, 2005, Mr. Schultz was sentenced in 
the Battery Case, 
and the district court retained jurisdiction; 
(9) Later in ihe day on December 12, 2005, Mr. Schultz pied guilty,
 pursuant 
to a plea agreemen( in the Drug Case and, again. the district 
court 
retained jurisdiction; 
(10) On May 22, 20061 following a period of retained jurisdiction,
 i.e., a ''rider," 
the di$trict court suspended Mr. Schultz's sentences in bo
th cases and 
pl&ced him on probation. It issued "temporart probation ord
ers the same 
day; 
(11) On May 25, 2006, the district court entered forma
l orders placing 
Mr. Schultz on probation; 
(12) On July 6, 2006, Mr. Schultz filed a Notice of Appeal
 bearing the case 
numbers for both the Drug Case and the Battery Case: 
(13) On July 7, 20061 the SAPD was appointed.to represent Mr. 
Schultz In both 
appeals and, on September 27, 2006, the Idaho Sup
reme Court ordered 
the two appeals consolidated; 
(14) On January 11, 2007 1 the SAPO received the Cle
rk's Record and 
Reporter's Transcript for the consolidated direct ap
peal; 
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(15) On or about February 21 1 2007, Molly J. H~k:ey engaged in a CUl'l~ry 
!"1View the Clerk~s ~ecord ~d Reporter's Transcript. filed a motion to 
autpend the briefing schedule on appeal pending disposition of some 
then-pending alleged probation violations, filed a motion to augment the 
record with a copy of an as-yet-unprepared tra,,script and to suspend the 
briefing schedule on appeal pending preparation of the missing transcript, 
and assigned Mr. Schultts conaolidsted direct appeal to me; 
(16) On March 2. 20071 the Supreme Court granted the motion to augment the 
record and suspended the briefing schedute pending · preparation of the 
requested transcript; 
(17) On March 20, 2007, although the· requested transcript had already been 
prepared, the Supreme Court order~ that the briefing schedule continue 
to be suspended pending dispo$ition of the aforementioned alleged 
probation violations; 
(18) On July 10, 2007, I spoke to Mr. Schultz for the first time, explaining that . 
since the briefing schedule was stlU suspended (at that time, I mistakenly 
believed we were waiting for a transcript, not disposition of the alleged 
probation violation). I had not reviewed his case; 
(19) On August 1, 2007, I again spoke to Mr. Schultz, whereupon I again 
indicated that I had not rew,wed the oase because the briefing schedule 
was stm suspended (I stiff mistakenly believed we were waiting for ~ 
transcript, not disposition of the alleged probation violation): 
• • . ,~'i 
... 
- .. .. 
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{20) During the fan of 2007, concerned about the length of time that 
Mr. Schultz's appeal had been suspended, 1 investigated the reason for 
the suspension. looked into the status of the alleged probation violations, 
leamed that the probation violations had already been adjudicated. and 
requested all of lhe relevant materials from the district court. At that time, 
t still had not reviewed the record in the consolidated appeal; 
(21) I spoke to Mr. Schultz again on Noverri.ber 5. 2007, November 27, 2007. 
and January 14. 2008. During most of those conversations, we discussed 
the status of the suspension of the. consolidated appeal. During the 
January 14, 2008 conversation, however, we discussed post-conviction 
relief petitions: 
{22} On · February 28, 2008: t received corffl$pondence from Mr. Schultz 
conttlining statements from certain Wf(nes&e$; 
(23} I responded to Mr. Schultz:'s February letter on March 3, 2008. In my 
letter, I explained that new evidence could not be utilized on appeal. 
reminded Mr. Sohuttz that claims of inaffecti"e es,istance of counsel are 
best reised in post-conviction proceedings, and concluded with the 
folfowing statement; "Because those claims are best reserved for post-
conviction, I suggest that you hold on to the notarized statements and 
consider using them to ·support a post-conviction petition whert the direct 
appeal is ovel' (emphasis added}; 
(24) In the meantime, on February 11, 2008, the Supreme Court had ordered 
the briefing schedule resumed; 
,. 
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(25) On May 16, 2008, I spoke to Mr. Schultz. agaio. During that discussion* 
we talked about the fact that the time limit for appealing from a judgment 
of conviction is extended where the defendant is granted a ''rider." 
Notably, at that time, I still had not reviewed the record in his consolidated 
appeal and, thus, I stilt had no idea that the notice of appeal in his case 
might not have been timely from his judgment of conviction. 
{28) It was not Ulltil approximately May 22, 2000 that I finally had an 
opportunity to review (in any detail at all) the record in Mr. Schultz's 
consolidated direct appeal; 
(27) My thorough review of the record on (or about) May 22, 2006 revealed 
that three additional transcripts were needed. Thus, on May 23, 2008, I 
filed another motion to augment the record (Wilh the necessary transcripts) 
and to suspend the briefing schedule (pending preparation of the 
requested transcripts). That motion was granted on June 20, 2008; 
(2C) On June 5, 2008, I spoke to Mr Schultz again. At that time, I did not 
infonn him that his notice of appeal may have been untimely filed, an
d I 
did not ~dvise him to file his patition(s) for post-oonv:ction relief 
immediately. In fact, when Mr. Schultz inquired about th~ advisability of 
filing a po&t-cooviction petition based on issues relating to the Drug Case, 
I told him that he could file a po5t-conviction petition at that time, but went 
on to advise him to wait until the conclusion of his direct appeal before 
fi/ir,g his post•conviction petition; 
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(29) In the meantima, Mr. Schultz had written to me on May 30, 2008. In my 
June 18, 2008 response to that letter, l again failed to make any mention 
of the possibility that his notice of appeal had been untimely filed, or that 
the statute of limitation for his post-conviction petition(&) may have begun 
to run. In fact, I suggested otherwise when I wrote as follows: "First, you 
are correct about the orie-year time limit for filing a petition for post-
oonviotion relief. That fime lim/1 will not begin to nm until the present 
appeal has concluded and a 'n,mittitur' hss been issued' (emphasis 
added); 
(30) I spoke to Mr. Schultz again on August 7, 2008. I still did not mention of 
the possibility that his notice of appeal had been untimely filed, or that the 
statute of limitation for post-conviction may have begun to run; 
(31) In August or September of 2008, I received and reviewed the last of the 
transcripts from Mr. Schultz's criminal cases, reacquainted myself with the 
record in his appeal, and finalized his Appellant's Brief; 
(32) I filed the Appellant's Brief (asserting claims of prosecutorial misconduct in 
the Batter/ case) on September 4 1 2008; 
{33) Afso on September 4, 2008, I spoke to Mr. Schultz again. During the 
course of that conversation, Mr. Schultz again asked me if there was any 
reason not to file his petmon(s) for post-conviction relief. I again told him 
that conventional wisdom dictates that a would-be petitioner should wait 
until his direct appeal has concluded before filing his petition(s) for post~ 
conviction relief, but I further explained that l saw no reason why he could 
..... 
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not file his petition(s) immediately. I atilt did not mention of the possibility 
that Mr. Schultz's notice of appeal had been untimely fled, or that the 
statute of llmltatlon for his post-conviction pelltlon(s) may have begun to 
run already; 
(3<4) My notes do n01 reflect whether it was (luring my May 2008 review of 
Mr. Schultz's case, or my August/September 2008 re-review of hlS case, 
that t first discovered that there was a potent;al problem with the 
.tlmeliness of Mr. Schultz's notice of appeal; however, I do recalt that It was 
during preparation of Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Brief that I first spotted this 
issue. Accordingly, I have no doubt that l first identified this issue In either 
late May 2008. or late August/early ~ptember 2008i 
(36) I edao remember that I did not see thia IGaue at a particularly significant 
problem at the time. Although-I remember discovering that Mr. Schultz's 
notice of. appeal was filed 42 days abr the "final• order placing him ori 
probation, and 45 days after the "temporary" order placing him on 
probation. I felt oonfident at that time that the ··temporary" probation order 
W$S not a final appealable order within the meaning of t.A.R. 11(0) and, 
thus, the 42-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal did not begin to run 
until iesuance of the "finat• probatiot:1 order, which was a final appealable 
order. t· reached this conclueion without refrnhing my memory as to the 
language of Ruin 11(c) or 14(a); 
(36) · Bec.auee I did not soe a eigniflcant problem with the timeHneas of 
Mr. Schultz's notice of appeal, Jnd never even Imagined that his appeal 
: ! • 
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. 
would be dismissed, or that his.time Umitfor filing his petttlon(s)·for post-
conViCUon relief could be deemed to have begun to run already, it never 
. . 
occurred to me to bring the matter to ·Mr. Schultz's attention, or to advise 
him to · file his petltion(s) for post-conviction relief immediately; 
(37} On November 24, 2008. the State filed its Respondent's Brief asserting 
that Mr. Schultz'& appeal was untimely, at least as to claims arising out of 
his conviction and sentence, because the notice of appeal was filed more 
than 42 days after Mr. Schultz was placed on probation; 
(38) On December 12. 2008. I spoke to Mr. Schulz regarding the state's 
Respondent's Brief. At that time, Mr. Schultz wa& concemed with the 
b"tate's argument that his appeal was.not timely; however, since I had not 
yet had an opportunity to review the Respondent's Brief, all c could tell 
Mr. Schuttz at that time was that I would look Into the timeliness issue 
when I had a chance to revisit his case; 
(39) On January 7, 2009, I spoke lo Mr. Schultz again. At that time, 
Mr. Schultz was still concenwd with the State's argument that hia appeal 
was not timely: however, owing to my excessive caseload, I~ had not 
had an opportunity to revisit Mr. Schultt's case and review the 
Respondenf1 Brief and, thus, had to put Mr. Schultz off again; 
(40) I finaUy had an opportunity to revisit Mr. Schultz's case and review the 
Respondent's Brief in .arty February of 2009: 
(41) Upon revieWing the Slate'$ Respondent's Brief, ,e .. reading I.A.R. 1-4(a), 
and giving some additional thought to the matter, I quickly concluded that 
t'.'Ji···, ...... ,• 
... 
.. 
•. 
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my initial impressions concerning the timeliness of Mr. Schuttz's notice of 
appeal were completely off-base. I realized that. in the unique situatiOn of 
a ·r1der.• the time to appeal from the judgment of conviction begins to run 
•tw]hen the court releases its retained jurisdiction or places the defendant 
on proba~n· and, thus, the question of whether there i& a final, 
appealable order within the meaning of Rule 11(c) Is irretevant; 
(42) While I was able to make a colorable argument (in Mr. Schultz's 
AppeUant's Reply Brief, flied February 11, 2009, and at oral argument 
before the Court of Appeals on May 1, 2009) that the oral pronouncement 
and '1emporary'" order in Mr. Schultz's case was insufficient to "place[ 1 the 
defendant on probation• within the meaning of Rule 14(a), f recognized 
that this WM a far weaker argument than I oriL1inally thought I would be 
able to make if the State raise~ the Issue of the timeHness of Mr. Schultz's 
appeal; 
(43) In light of my new, more-informed analysis of the kisue of the timeliness of 
Mr. SchultZ's notice of appeal, I promptly infonned Mr. Schultz of the 
possibiity that his appeal might be dismissed; however, I initially failed to 
advise him to file his post-conviction petition(s) immediately (inetead, t 
continued to advise him, consistent with conventional wisdom, to wait until 
hi& direct appeal had concluded). On February 11, 2009, the same date 
that I filed Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Reply Brief. I wrote to him as follows; 
My reco!lemion is that when I originally reviewed your case, I 
noticed that the notice of appeal \'V8S not timely from the 
district court's temporary order placing you on probation, but 
~a& filed 42 days attar the district court's fcrmal order was. 
./ 
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filed. I foresaw a potential problem with this at that time and 
was camful in discussing the faot5 surrounding this issue in 
the Appellant's Brief. I couldn't be dishonest or misleading, 
but I also did not want to draw any unnecessary attention to 
these facts because my hope was that the State would not 
spot this potential isSue. At that time, I believed that even if 
the State did spat this, we would have a fairly strong 
argument that your time to appeal did not start runtiing until 
the fom1al c,rder was entered. Now that the State has raised 
the issue and I have had an opportunity to review Idaho 
Appellate Rule 14(a) more carefully, however, I do not 
believe our argument is as strong as 1 ·originally thought it 
was. Thus, at this time, I would not be surprised if the State 
prevail3 on this issue and the appellate-court dismisses your 
appeal. ObviQusly, this is not good news at alt 
If it turns out that the your appeal is dismissed, I 
would strongly urge you to consider filing a petition for post-
conviction relief contending that Mr. Pena provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file the notice 
of appeal sooner. 
(44) On March 5, 2Q09, I had a fairly long and detailed conversation with 
Mr. Schultz about the timeliness of his notice of appeal, the fact that I now 
believed that his appeal was likely to be dismissed, and the possibilit
y of 
filing a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel h
ad 
been ineffective for railing to file timely notices of appeal. At that time
, I 
explained for the first time that I was concerned about when the one-
year 
statute of limitations may begin running (or may be deemed to have begun 
running). I explained that I did not know whether, or when, the postM 
conviction statute of limitations had begun to run and, therefore, in 
an 
abundance of caution, I advised Mr. Schultz: to file his post-convic
tion 
petitlon(s) as soon as possible; 
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(45) On May 29, 2009, the Idaho Court of Appeals di&miSSed Mr. Schultz's 
consolidated direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction, based upon its 
conclusion that the notice of appeal had not been ttmely fded; 
(48) I filed a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, as well as a 
supporting brief, but on August 20. 2009, the Supreme Court denied 
review. It issued a remittitur on August 27, 2009; 
(47) In 1he meantime, on January 13, 20091 Mr. Schultz had filed a post-· 
conviction petition based on his conviction In the Drug Case and, on 
February 20, 2009, filed an amended petition alleging, in part that his 
counsel had rendered ineffective aesistance for ·tailing to flte a timely 
notice of appeal In the Drug Case; 
(48) Later. on March 24, 2009, Mr. Schultz filed a petition for post-oonviction 
relief based on his conviction in the Battery case. On November 12, 
2009. he made a supplemental tiling in that case, alleging that his counsel 
had rendered ~ve assistance for failing to fde a timely notice of 
appeal in the Battery Case; 
(49) Although counsel was ~ppointed to represent Mr. Schultz in his post-
conviction cues. and although his counsel advanced an equitable 
toffing/diaoovery exception argument in response· to the State's oontentlon 
that Mr. Schultz's post-conviction petitions were untimely filed, coumset 
never contacted me to secure an affidavit such as this one, or even to 
Investigate the fact that Mr. Schultz could not have known that the statute 
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of limitation for his post~convlction claims may have been running even 
While his dire~t appeal was still pending; 
(50) Nevertheless, Mr. Schultz called me himself on August 14, 2009 and 
asked me to prepare an affidavit outlining the above facts. At that time, I 
told him I would be happy to provide such an affidavit but, 
misunderstanding the proceduraf posture of his post-conviction cases (as 
it turns out, the State had already filed a motion fer summary dismissal of 
the petition relating to the Battery Case based, primarily, on the statute of 
limitation), I declined to do so immediately: 
(51) On September 2, 2009, I received a letter from Mr. Schultz again inquiring 
about my willingness to prepare an affidavit on his behalf; 
(52) On September 3, 2009, I responded to Mr. Sc."lultz's letter. As my 
response indicates, at that time, I was still unwilling to provide the 
requested affidavit because, still misunderstanding the procedural posture 
of his post-coiwiction cases (by this point, the State had filed a motion for 
summary dismissal of the petition relating to the Drug Case as well-
again, based primarily on the statute of limitation), I felt that the affidavit 
might actually harm his post .. conviction cases. My response included the 
following: 
I was concerned that the disclosure of such an affidavit, if 
not appropriately timed, might actually be detrimental. 
With regard to this latter point, as I explained on the 
telephone, you may never need an affidavit from me 
because the State may never argue that your post-conviction 
petition was not timely filed. In such a case, I would be very 
reluctant to provide the affidavit to you for fear of you 
disclosing it prematurely and, thereby, tipping the State off to 
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a statute qf limitations argument that it had not previously 
thought of. On the other hand1 if ihe State moves for 
summary dilminal of your petition for post-conviotio.n relief 
(or If the district court gives notice of ita intent to dl$miss your 
petition) on the basis that the one-year sta~te of limitation 
began to run even before the court of Appeals dismissed 
your appeal, then I will be happy to provide you with an 
affidavit ...• 
(63) Ultim.tely, in the absence o~ my affidavit the diatrict court rejected 
Mr. Schultz.'& equitable totling/discoverv e>ecsptton arguments and 
summarily dismissed his post·con\iction pe~tions as having been filed 
outside the one-year &tato1a of limitation; 
(54) Had Mr. Schultz's post-conviction counsel contacted me, l could have 
provided evidence, I.e., an affidavit such at this one, that I believe would 
have · provided additional·. support for Mr. Schultz's equitable 
toling/discovery exception argument in 1'88ponse to the State's statute of 
!Imitations defense in his post.conviction caseaj 
(55) Given Mr. Schultz's trial COUO$el's action in filing a late notice of appeal. 
my early assurances that Mr. Schultz could wait to file his petition(s) for· 
post-com,iotion n1Hef, ai,d my '1/ery late recognition that the notice of 
appeal was probably untimely, I simply do not see any way that 
Mr. Schultz could have known that hit oonsolidated direct appeal was 
subject to dl1mlasal1 or that the statute of llrnitltions for filing his petitton(s) 
for post-conviction relief could possibl\' have begun running, at least untH 
after his receipt of the State•s November 24. 2008 Respondent's Brief; and 
(86) Even then, I do not see how Mr. Sch~ttz MRonably could be expected to 
have knOWn that his consolidated direct appeal was subject to dismissal, 
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my initial Impressions concerning the timeliness of Mr. Sch~ltZ's notice of 
appeal were completely off-base. l realized that, in the unJue situation. of 
a "rider," Ille lime to appeal Jlwn the judgment ol ~ begins to ""' 
·[w]hen the court releases its retained juriadictiOn or place, the defendant 
on proba~n" and, thus, the queation of whether th~re i& a final, 
appealable order within the meaning of Rule 11(c) is irretev.nt; 
(42) While I was abt. to make a colorable argument (in Mr. Schultz'& 
AppeRant's Reply Brief, filed February 11, 2009, and , oral argument 
before the Court of Appeals on May 1, 2009) that the oral pronouncement 
and "temporary" order in Mr. Schultz's case was insufficie~t to •ptaoe( 1 the 
defendanl on p;ui)aiion' wllhin the meaning 0H'1u1e 14(r), I n,cognizm 
that this was a far weaker argument than I originaUy thl ght I would be 
able to make if the State raise~ the issue of the timeline~ of Mr. Schultz'& 
appeal; / 
(43) In light of my new, more~informed analysis of the iGsue of/the timeline&S of 
Mr. SChultl's IIQlice of appeal, I prompt!-/ Informed ,,. Schultz of Iha 
posslbiUty that his appeat mig~t be dismissed; however, 11 initially failed to 
advise him to file his post-conviction petition(s) lmme1iately (instead, I 
continued to advise him, consistent with conventional wlrtom, to wait untn 
his direct appeal had concluded). On February 11. 2 9, the same date 
that I filed Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Reply Brief. I wrote t him as follow8: 
My reco!lection is that when 1 originally reViewed our case, I 
noticed that the notice of appeal was not timely the 
district court's temporary order placing you on p11 batton. but 
!f1ia8 filed 42 days Elfter the district court's formal rder was 
,/ 
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2010. 
or that the statute of timitations for filing his petitton(s) for p st-conviction 
relief could possibly be rua,nlng, until after March 5, 2009, the date on 
which I told Mr. Schultz that I believed that his appeal wa likely to be 
dismissed, revealed the possibility that the one-year statute of limitations 
may begin running (or may be deemed to have begun run ing already), 
and recommended that Mr. Schultz file his post-conviction petition(s) as 
soon as possible. 
ERIK R. LEH 
Deputy State Appellate P blic Defender 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2111 day of 
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FIL D-DISTRICT COURT 
CAS 
TIM 6J.{)1Mt 
FEB 2 7 2014 
Thl THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi FIFTH ruDICIAL DI TRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 1INIDOKA 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, Case No. CV~201 -96 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
NOTICE OF NT TO 
DISMISS POST CONVICTION 
APPLICATION ND ORDER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
VACATING HE G 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz (hereafter "Mr. Schultz'') found guilty after 
trial of felony domestic battery in Minidoka County case CR-2005- 139. He pled guilty 
to possession of a controlled substance in Minidoka County case CR- 005-884.1 
On January 13, 2009, Mr. Schultz filed a post-conviction c Minidoka. County 
case CV-2009-47, regarding the drug possession case, CR-2005-884. n March 24, 2009, 
Mr. Schultz filed a post-conviction case, Minidoka County case CV- 009-221, regarding 
the domestic battery case, CR-2005-1139. He received appointed co el in both cases. 
I A more detailed procedural history is contained in the court's prior Notice or Intent to Dis~ss Post-
Conviction Application, entered September 5, 2013. 
NOTICR OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICTION APPLICATlON AND ORDER VACATING HEARING 
CV-2011-96 ?age 1 
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The State filed motions to dismiss both post-conviction peti · ons, arguing that 
they had been filed outside the one-year statute of limitations provi in Idaho Code § 
19-4902(a). On January 8, 2010, the court granted the State's mo ·ons. Mr. Schultz 
appealed. On May 9, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed th dismissal of Mr. 
Schultz's post-conviction petitions. See Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 83, 256 P.3d 791 
(Ct.App.2011). 
On Januaiy 21, 2011, Mr. Schultz filed the successive post-co viction petition in 
this case. On November 6, 2013, he filed the Second Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereafter "Second Amended Succe sive Petition"). 
The court hereby gives notice to the parties of its intent to dis · s Mr. Schultz's 
Second Am.ended Successive Petition. 
DISCUSSION 
When a court is satisfied that a post-conviction applicant "is n t entitled to post-
conviction relief and no pwpose would be served by any further ceedings, it may 
indicate to the parties its intention t.o clismiss the application and its re ans for so doing." 
LC. § 19-4906(b). The court intends to dismiss Mr. Schultz's econd Amended 
Successive Petition because the ineffective assistance of counsel 
conviction proceeding is not a "sufficient reason" for filing a successiv petition for post-
conviction relief. lvlr. Schultz's Second Amended Successive Petition s barred by Idaho 
Code§ 19-4908. 
In the Second Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz 
ineffective assistance of· counsel regarding David Pena (hereafter 
attorney in the underlying criminal cases. Although this claim was alle dly raised in his 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DJSMJSS POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION A."1D ORDER V CATINO HEARING 
CV-2011-96 Page 2 
87 of 109
87 of 109
original post-conviction petitions, Mr. Schultz contends that he is 'tted to raise this 
claim regarding Mr. Pena in the Second Am.ended Successive P titian because he 
received ineffective assistance from Clayne Zollinger, his attorney · 
• • 2 
conVIction cases. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4908 provides: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this a must be 
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. y ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, vol tarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the co viction or 
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to s cure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unle the court 
fmds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reas n was not 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, suppl ental, or 
amended application. · 
(Emphasis added.) 
Earlier case law provided that the ineffective assistance of pri r post-conviction 
counsel could provide sufficient reason to perm.it an applicant for post- nviction relief to 
file a successive petition and assert grounds for relief that were adjudi ted or waived in 
the prior post-conviction proceeding. See Palmer v. Dennitt, 102 Idaho 591, 595-96, 635 
. . 
P.2d 955, 959-60 (1981); Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 1 8 P.3d 975, 978 
(Ct.App.2006); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 
(Ct.App.1999); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 9 2 (Ct.App.1987). 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that because post-conviction 
petitioner "has no statutory ·or constitutional right to effective· as 'stance of post-
conviction counsel, [he or] she cannot demonstrate 'sufficient re on' for filing a. 
2 1n the Second Amended Successive Petltion, Mr. Schultz also attempts to rais a claim of newly 
discovered evidence. However, this claim was dismissed .in the court's Order Reg · g the Court's Notice 
9f l~ent to Dismiss and the Petitioner's Motion to Amend Successive Petition fur Po t-Conviction Relict 
entered October 3J.2013. Since this claim has been dismissed, the court will not a s it at this time. 
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successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel "Murphy v. State, 
No. 40483, 2014 WL 712695, at *6 (Idaho Feb. 25, 2014). 
I 
The only cited basis for allowing the successive petition 4 this case is the 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. Because this ii not a "sufficient 
reason" for filing a successive petition, Mr. Schultz's claim of ineffc ·ve assistance of 
counsel regardm.g Mr. Pena in the Second Amended Successive Pe· tion is barred by 
Idaho Code § 19-4908. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing considerations and analysis, the court is satisfied that Mr. 
Schultz is not entitled to post-conviction relief and that there would be o purpose served 
by further proceedings. The court gives notice that it intends to dis ·ss Mr. Schultz's 
Second Amended Successive Petition. Mr. Schultz has tvl•enty (20) dars to reply as set 
I 
forth in Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b). 
In light of the court's intent to dismiss this case. the State's Mo ·on for Summary 
Dismissal, filed December 12, 2013, may be moot. Therefore, the he g set for March 
21, 2014 regarding tbe State's motion is hereby vacated. 
f<. 
It is so ORDERED this 2 r _ day of February, 201 .. ------t-""?I-------
MICHAELR.C 
District Judge 
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Wally Kay Schultz 
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McRAE LAW OFFICE. PLLC 
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P.O. Box 1233 
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Telephone No. (208) 944-0755 
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF fIHE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUN'IY OF MINID01 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, ') ) Case No. CR-2011-96 
Petitioner, ) ) PETITIONER'S REP Y TO NOTICE 
vs. . ) OF INTENT TO DIS SS 
) 
. STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Wally Kay Schultz, by and through hif attorney of record,· · 
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Reply to~ Court's Notice of · 
Intent to Dismiss as filed on February 27, 2014 (the "Notice oflntent"). ~ the Notice of'l~terit, 
·the Court sets forth reasoning to dismiss Petitioner's Second Verified iAmended Successive: 
· · Petition/or Post Conviction Relief as filed on November 6, 2013(the "Petitibn"). 
Herein, Petitioner sets forth why his claims must be allowed tol proceed. Petitioner 
. ·asserts herein that despite recent Idaho case law, Petitioner claims that he' a right to effective· 
• ,asoistaru:e of counsel upon his mitial. collatffll lfflCW procecdiPg (4tioncr's ~itial pOSI· 
conviction proceeding) under federal law. Petitioner seeks this Co$ to dkect that the 
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proceedings should continue in this matter pursuant'to Idaho Code § 19-4906(h). Petiti~ner 
seeks oral argument on this matter. 
DISCUSSION 
At issue in the present matter is whether Petitioner can claim an ineffective assistance of 
counsel argument on Clayne Zollinger ("Zollinger,,), the attorney who represented Petitioner in 
his original post-conviction petitions in Minidoka County Case No. CV-2009-0000047 (as it 
related to CR;.2005-0000884) and CV-2009-0000221 (as it related to CR-2005-II39) 
(collectively the "Prior Petitions"). See the Petition at 2-4. This Court now cites the recent 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court of Alisha Ann Murphy v. State of Idaho, filed February 25, 
2014. Docket No. 40483 as authority to dismiss Petitioner's present Petition. Petitioner has 
expressly relied upon Palmer v. Dermilt, 102 Idaho 591 (See the Petition at 2-4). And, in 
Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly overrules Palmer. See Murphy at 8. However, as is 
set forth herein, Petitioner asserts that he can continue to claim ineffective assistance of counsel 
in his initial collateral review proceeding (the Prior Petition) under recent decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court and under federal law. 
Petitioner first acknowledges the rulings of the United States Supreme Court that hold 
"[T]here ii no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings." See 
Coleman 11. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 725 (1991) and Pennsylvania v. Finley. 481 U.S. 551 
(1987). The Idaho Supreme Court was relying on this rule when it decided the Murphy decision; 
in fact. the Idaho Supreme Court cited Pennsylvania v. Finley in its decision in Murphy. Murphy 
at 7. 
However, in Martinez v. Ryan,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), the United States 
Supreme Court ruled a new exception to Coleman and Finley that "inadequate assistance of 
PETITIONRR'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - 2 -
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counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural 
default of a claim ... " The Court limited its ruling in Martinez (that a petitioner can rely upon 
the argument that counsel was ineffective upon an initial review collateral proceeding to seek 
relief) to stat.es which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial 
in the collateral proceeding. Id. at 1316 (2012). The Court explains: 
Coleman v. Thompson ... left open. and the Court of Appeals in this case 
addressed,, a question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right 
to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first 
occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Id. These 
proceedings can be called, for purposes of this opinion, "initial-review 
collateral proceedings. Colema11 Juul surgested, though without holding, 
t/,111 the Co111tlhltio• may re9llitt States to proville counsel in initial~ 
rnicw collatmwl prt)Ct.edlnfl b«a1111. 'in /tieM} .•. stat, .co/ltlw4l 
l'llWW 11· the jlnt pltu:e " prisoner can pn.telll a chalkltre 'IO his 
conviction." [Citation omitted]. As Coleman noted. this makes the 
initial-review collateral proceeding a prisoner's 'one and only' appeal as 
to the ineffective-assistance claim [citation omitted], and this may justify 
an exception to. the constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in 
collateral proceedings. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court reasoned, in application to Arizona's laws. "the initial-review 
collateral proceeding is the firs.t designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways equivalent of a prisoner's 
direct appeal as the incffi:ctivc-assistance claim." Id. at 1317 (2012). Furthermore, the Court 
recognized that ''a prisoner's inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern 
when the dabn is one of ineffective assistance of counsel. The right to the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system:' Id. 
And, of particular import, the Court further recognized, ''In.effectlve•tusistance /of trial 
coUMtd} clt1ima often depend on evltlen.ce outside the triffl record. Direct appeals, witl1out 
e,,identiary hearings, may ,wt be as effective as other proceedings for developil'lg die factual 
basis for the claim. u Id. at 1318. (Emphasis added). As such, the Court held that Martinez 
PE.111'10NER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF JNTBNT TO DISMISS - 3 -
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could assert die ineffective assistance of his initi.al~revicw collateral proceeding attorney because 
his collateral proceeding was the first occasion that Martinez was able to raise his claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial. Id. at 1320. 
Following the Martina decision, the United States Supreme Court further considered 
when a pOSt-conviction petitioner can claim ineffective assistance of counsel upon an initial-
review collateral proceediog in Trevin~ v. Thaler, _ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 191 l (2013). In 
Tl'evlno. the Court looked at Texas's laws, whlch by design and opeJ.'lltion. makes it unlikely in a 
typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance 
of trial counsel claim on direct appeal. Id. at 1913 (2013). The Court oonsidel'Cd that while 
Texas laws do allow for ineffective assistance of trial counsel OP direct review, they do not allow 
procedures to adequately develop the record. Id. As such. the Court held that even though Texas 
laws allowed for ineffective assistance of trial claims on direct appeal. that the post-conviction 
was the best way in Texas to develop this argument. Id. at 1913-14 (2013). As such, the Court 
ruled that Trevino could brioa an ineffective assistance of counsel clairn on his attorney in his 
initial-review· collateral proceedina for failing to properly bring an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on his trial counsel. Id. The Court ruled: 
The right iuvolvcd - adequate assistance of trial counsel - is similarly and 
critically important. In both instaces practical consideration, - the 
M«l/or 1111sw lt,wyu, the neetl to ,xp,1111/ tl11 trlfll com NCOttl, """ the 
IIMI for 111f/kiellt tl111e to deNlop the claim - "'I• lt,ongly for illitlal 
consideration of the claim d"riffK a collateral, not II ditttt, rnMw. See 
Martinez, 566 U.S., at--' 132 S.Ct., at_. In both instances failure to 
consider a lawyers "ineffectiveness .. during an initial-review collateral 
proceeding as potential "cause" for excusing a procedural default will 
deprive the defendant of any opportunity for nwiew of an ineffeetive-
assistance-of-trial counsel claim. [Citation omitted]. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
PETl"rlONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - 4 -
94 of 109
94 of 109
03-11-'14 15:43 FHCX"I-Hepworth & Assoc. 208-736-0041 T-206 P0006/0008 F-341 
In application to Idaho law. Petidoner recognius that generally, he bas the right to claim 
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel on direct appeal. However. Idaho case law bas 
established the procedural concerns that have been expressed in TreYlno, which makes the 
analysis and ruling in Trevino applicable to Idaho. In State v. Saxton. the Idaho Court of appeals 
explains making an ineffective assistance of trial counsel argument on direct appeal in stating: 
The presentation of Saxton's ineffective assistance claims compels this Court 
to once again mtera• tut It i.t ,ulldy mfl/lPl'O/lrltdl to n,ise 111cl, a m, 
on " dinct .,,.,i from 11,e )lltlgment of conviction. T/tls Is so 6ecatde 
CM""6 o/ llll!Jfdve ""~ re,lllarly ndu i.rl11a on whlcl, M ev/tlaau 
was pNH11ted Id the defMllant's trltd. Beet,,. t1,, competMcy of countel 
l.t not an lau bl a cl'lntllull trial, the trlol record OIi dlNCt fl/lPMI is !!!l'.!11, 
..._,. for rwiew of s.eh clailfl.t. As Justice Bakes stated in Carter v. 
State. 108 Idaho 788. 702 P .2d 826 (1985): TN qllUll011 of COIIIJ}dalcy of 
0011111-1 II an OirelMly COIIIJJ/u factl#ll tldermilllltilla wllldr, in gll but t/,f 
NB RPM( tmn. ,eq,dro a tmtlD,llruy ,,.,,,,,, btfor, 4-rlllinatlon. 
11w n,olldlM of ti,,,. fllCt#al i.tsMG for tl,e ./hi dlM llpOII appeal, baN 
IIJIM II trit,1 IWO'lll bt wl,kl, CO'llfl*nce of co,11,s,J was not at la~, la at 
llat conjedluYIL 
If an appellate court were to reach the merits of ineffective assistance issues 
nused on a direct appealt the absence of any record supporting the claims 
would perally require a decision adverse to ~he appellant, which would 
become re, Judicato. Coa~w,,tly, we CllffOllltll'l/y dedln, to lllldnn sud, 
cll,IMs 011 app«Jl from tu judp,ellt of con'Pit:tlon. Md we h•N r,peatt#lly 
tld,,,.1§11«1 tlurt IA,y are 11111N IIJJJROPrllltely plll'Sued tl,l'Ough post-
co"'1lctlon relief actlt,u, w.vre tit, nl*ntltl,y record car, 6e propmy 
ds,dtJpeil. (Numerous citations omitted). 
State v. Saxton. 133 Idaho S46, 549. 989 P.2d 288,291 (Idaho App. 1999). 
This language in Saxton shows the same concems for arguing an ineffective assistance of 
counsel daun on direct appeal in Idaho that are present under Texas law in Trevino. Namely, the 
Idaho Court of Appeal stat.es that such a clain1 on dm:ct appeal would not have sufficient factnal 
inquiry (i.e .• there would be "the ll#d to apt111tl the trltll mun r«or4''. See Trevino at 1913-14 
(2013)) and directly states that most claims are "more appropriately pursued through post-
conviction relief actions ••. " As such. because claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are 
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mo~ appropriately brought in post-conviction claims, under Trevino. a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on an initial collateral review proceeding (i.e.. an initial post-conviction 
proceeding) raises Sixth Amendment concerns of ineffective assistance of that collateral revrew 
proceeding eoun11l. 
In tho present matter. Petitioner is claiming ineffective assistance of his initial collateral 
review proceeding attorney, Zollinger. He is claiming that Zollinger failed to assert the claims as 
set forth in the Petition - specifically, that he failed to adeqmtely pursue Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective aasistance of Petitioner's trial counsel, David Pena. Under Saxton, Petitioner's claim 
against his 1rial attorney would have most appropriately been brought in bis original post-
conviction proceeding in contrast to seeking it on appeal. Petitioner now asserts that because his 
claim for ineffective assistance of his trial counsel was not appmpriate in his direct appeal 
(because Petitioner would not have had a sufficient record to establish the claim on direct appeal. 
he would not have had sufficient Opportunity to establish his claim, and such a claim would most 
likely have been denied under Saxton), Petitioner's claim in his original post-conviction 
proceeding was needed. and Petitioner was guaranteed effective assistance of counsel in tho 
same pursuant to Trevino. As suoh, Petitioner continues to assert his claim in his Petition. 
Finally, Petitioner notes that the Court's decision - based upon Mwphy - is that 
ineffectiw assistance of prior post-conviction coumol is not sufficient ieason under Idaho Ca,sk 
§ 19-4908 for allowing a succesmve petition. Petitioner asserts pursuant to the above analysis 
that he was entitled to effective wistancc of counsel at his initial collateral review proceeding 
from Zollinger, which is a sufficient reason under Idaho Code § 19-4908 for allowing his present 
(and successive) petition. . 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that the Court, pursuant to Idaho Cgdc § 
19-4906(b) direct that the proceedings continue. Additionally, Petitioner requests an oral hearing 
on this matter for all issues raised. 
DATED this 11t11 day of March. 2014. 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By,~h-----
Stei:McRae 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Steven R. McRae, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the 
11th day of March. 2014, he served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document 
upon the following: 
Lance Stevenson 
Prosecuting Att.omcy for 
the County of Minidoka 
P.O. Box368 
Rupert, ID 833SO 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ X ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Steven R. McRae 
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT 
CASE# 
-------
TIME \\'.30ii:-l\A . 
APR 9 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFI'H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, Case No.CV-2011-96 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DISMISSING POST-
CONVICTION APPLICATION 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz (hereafter "Mr. Schultz'') was found guilty after 
trial of felony domestic battery in Minidoka County case CR-2005-1139. He pied guilty 
to possession of a controlled substance in Minidoka County case CR-2005-884. 
On January 13 and March 24, 2009, Mr. Schultz filedpost-convictionpeti1ions in 
Minidoka County cases CV-2009-47 and CV-2009-221. He received appointed counsel 
in both cases. The State filed motions to dismiss both post-conviction petitions. The court 
granted the State's motions, and Mr. Schultz appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Schultz's post-conviction petitions. See Schultz v. State, 
151 ldaho 383,256 P.3d 791 (Ct.App.2011). 
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On January 21, 2011, Mr. Schultz filed the successive post-conviction petition in 
this case. On November 6, 2013, he filed the Second Verified Amended Successive 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereafter "Second Amended Successive Petition.,.,). 
The court entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post-Conviction Application on Febntary 
27, 2014. Mr. Schultz filed a reply on March 11, 2014. After a hearing on April 7, 2014, 
the court took the matter imder advisement. 
DISCUSSION 
In the Second Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz asserts a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding David Pena (hereafter "Mr. Pena"), his 
attorney in the underlying criminal cases.1 Although. this claim was allegedly raised in the 
original post-conviction petitions, Mr. Schultz contends that he is permitted to raise it in 
the Second Amended Successive Petition because he received ineffective assistance from 
Clayne Zollinger, his attorney in the original post-conviction cases. 
With regard to subsequent applications for post-conviction relief, Idaho Code § 
19-4908 provides: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be 
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, volwrtarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or 
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, wtless the court 
finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not 
asspted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or 
amended application. 
1 In t.l1e Second Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz also attempted to raise a. claim of newly 
discovered evidence. However, thls claim was dismissed in 1he court's October 31, 2013 order regarding 
an earlier notice of intent to dismiss. Therefore, the court will not address thi, y!aim 'at this time. 
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I.C. § 19-4908 (emphasis added.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that because a 
post-conviction petitioner "has no statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel, [he or) she cannot demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a 
successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel.'' Murphy v. State, 
No. 40483, 2014 WL 712695, at "'6 (Idaho Feb. 25, 2014). 
The only basis cited for allowing the successive petition in this case is the alleged 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. Under lmtrphy, this is not a 
"sufficient reason" for filing a successive petition. Therefore, the claims raised in Mr. 
Schultz's Second Amended Successive Petition regarding Ivfr. Pena are barred by Idaho 
Code § 19-4908. 
Despite the holding in Murphy, Mr. Schultz contends that the ineffective 
assistance of prior post~conviction counsel is a "suffi.ci.ent reason" for ftling a successive 
petition. He contends that he was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in his 
original post-conviction cases because those cases were initial-review collateral 
proceedings. In support of this argument, Mr. Schultz relies on Martinez v. Ryan, - U.S. 
"·-, 132 S.Ct. 1309 {2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, -- U.S. ---. 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013). · 
The United States Supreme Court has held that there is "no constitutional right to 
an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson) 501 U.S. 722, 
752, 111 S.Ct. 2546~ 2566 (1991). In .1.vfartinez and Trevino, the United States Supreme 
Court did not hold that a petitioner has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in a state post-conviction case. Instead, those cases address a narrow issue: 
"whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of 
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ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause for a procedural default in a federal 
habeas proceeding." },,fartinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315 (emphasis added). 
Generally. "any attorney error that led to the default of [a petitioner's] claims in 
state oourt cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas." Coleman. 501 
U.S. at 757, 111 S.Ct. at 2568. In Martinez, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
a narrow exception to this general rule, holding: 
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural 
default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial 
claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 
proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 
ineffective. 
132 S.Ct. at 1320 (emphasis added). In Martinez, the Arizona law at issue required 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to be raised in a state collateral proceeding 
and not on direct appeal. 132 S.Ct. at 1314. In Trevino, the United States Supreme Court 
el..'Pan.ded the Martinez holding to apply to cases in which applicable state law grants 
permission to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal but, "as 
a matter of procedural design and systemic operation, denies a meaningful opportunity to 
. . 
do so." 133 S.Ct. at 1921. 
Ali set forth above, Martinez and Trevino do not establish that a petitioner has a 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in a state post-conviction case. 
Rather, these cases address a narrow issue regarding procedural default in federal habeas 
proceedings. This is not a federal habeas proceeding. Therefore, the cases upon which 
Mr. Schultz has relied have no bearing on Idaho Code§ 19-4908 and the application of 
the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy to this case. 
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Based on the foregoing considerations and analysis, the court is satisfied that Mr. 
Schultz is not entitled to post:.Conviction'relief and that there would be no purpose served 
by further proceedings. The court..h~by dismisses Mt. Schultz's Second Amended 
Successive Petition~ its entirety. piir~t to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). 
· It is so ORDERED this _f_ day of April, 201.Qc:====----=:::::::=-?"'7'""---::~-~ 
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _j__ of ,4-p&:1 , 2014, I served a true, 
correct copy of the ORDER DISMISSING POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION on the 
following in the manner provided: 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor ~Email 
Steven R. McRae 
P. 0. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
(f.) Email 
Wally Kay Schultz 
212 6th Ave. West 
CA Mail 
Jerome, ID 83338 
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT 
CASE# 
TIME_ ---:7\ :-:: .. ~:--0-N,\Jl--
APR 9 2014 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2011-96 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Judgment is entered in favor of the Respondent State of Idaho and against the 
Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz. The petition for post-conviction relief in the above~entitled 
case is dismissed in its entirety. 
~ 
DATED this .2_ day of April, 2014. u:¥Z;· 
?vfICHAELR.CRABTREE 
District Judge 
RIGHT TO APPEAL/LEA VE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
The Right The court hereby advises the Petitioner of the right to appeal this 
Judgment within forty two (42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court 
I.AR. 14(a). 
In Form.a Pauperis: The court further advises the Petitioner of the right of a person 
who is unable to pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in fonna pauperis, 
meaning the right as an indigent to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and 
the right to be represented by a court appointed attorney at no cost to the Petitioner. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -1-- of ttp.AA} , 2014, I served a true, 
correct copy of the JUDGMENT on the following in the manner provided: 
Lance Stevenson 
Minidoka County Prosecutor 
Steven R. McRae 
P. 0. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
Wally Kay Schultz 
212 6th Ave. West 
Jerome, ID 83338 
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¥-) Email 
('b Mail 
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To: Lawrence G. Wasden 
State Attorney General 
PO Box83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Sara Thomas 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 Lake Harbor Ln. Ste. 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42095 
Minidoka County Case No. CR2011-96 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
Vs. 
Wally K Schultz, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
NOTICE OF FILING OF CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT ON CD 
Notice is hereby given that one complete copy of the Limited CLERK'S RECORD is 
Being sent to Counsels' of record. Be advised of the twenty-eight (28) day settlement period as 
Required by IAR 29. Please file any objection to the record and transcript, including any requests for 
corrections, deletions or additions with the District Court, together with a Notice of Hearing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court in Rupert, 
Idaho, the J.';}.,J.._ day of Me, , 2014. 
Patty Temple 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:d~7YJr4{ 
Deputy Clerk 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
' JvL_ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the );;, day of ~< , 2014, I mailed a true, 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by U.S. first-class mail, postage pre-
paid, upon the following unless a different method of service is indicated: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Po Box83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Sara Thomas 
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane, Ste. 100 
Boise, ID 83707 
SUPREME COURT 
COURT OF APPEALS 
PO Box83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
107 of 109
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Wally Kay Schultz 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 42095-2014 
District Court No. CR-2011-96 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
SERVICE 
I, Laurie McCall, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that I have personally served 
or mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the 
parties or their attorney of record as follows: 
Lawrence Wasden, Esq. 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Sara Thomas 
STATE APPELLATE PD 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane Ste. 100 
Boise, ID 83 707 
IN WITNESS WHEREq!', I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court in Rupert, Idaho, the ;J?;IVC..... day of May, 2014. 
PATTY TEMPLE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:~frl~ 
auneMcCall, Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 -
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Wally Kay Schultz, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Minidoka ) 
* * * * * * 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 42095 
) 
) District Court# CR-2011-96 
) 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO 
) RECORD 
) 
) 
I, Patty Temple, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 
28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 23rd day of April, 
2014. 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: ····~in,~ 
LaurieMcall, Deputy Cleik -
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO RECORD - 1 -
109 of 109
109 of 109
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Wally Kay Schultz, 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Minidoka ) 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 42095 
DIST. CT. CASE NO. CR-2011-96 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
RE: EXHIBITS 
I, PA TTY TEMPLE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that I am sending the following exhibit: 
None. 
That the Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of the record on appeal in the above-
entitled cause and are being sent to the Clerk of the Supreme Court with the Clerk's Record on 
Appeal, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Rupert, Idaho, this r?rJ...day of ~ , 2014. 
PATTY TEMPLE 
Clerk of the District Court (SEAL) 
By:La~g;~rk 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK RE: EXHIBITS - 1 -
2083342985 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
1.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
1.S.B. #6247 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 Boise, ID 83703 (208) 334-2712 
12:04: 15 05-22-2014 
FILED-DISTRICT COURT 
CASE# 
TIME ----:(:-=-:-t/5---p-/l'\-
, 
MAR 2 2 2014 
PATTY TEMPLE, CLERK 
c:/c= , DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MINIDOKA COUNTY 
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ, ) 
Petitioner-Appellant, l CASE NO. CV 2011-96 v. ) S.C. DOCKET NO. 42095 
STATE OF IDAHO, l AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL Re11pondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, LANCE D. STEVENSON, MINIDOKA COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 715 G STREET, P.O. BOX 368, RUPERT, ID, 83350, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Dismissing Post 
Conviction Application and Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 
9th day of April, 2014, the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree, presiding. 
2. · That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a), I .AR. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 
2 /6 
2083342985 12:04:58 05-22-2014 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other Issues on appeal, is/are: 
(a) Did the district court err in dismissing the appellant's Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief? 
4. There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record 
that Is sealed is the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). 
5. Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.A.R. 25(c). The appellant 
also requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a} Motion Hearing held on October 28, 2013 (Court Reporter: 
Maureen Newton. no estimation of pages was listed on the Beaister of 
Actions); and 
(b) Motion Hearing held on April 7, 2014 (Court Reporter: Maureen 
Newton. no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of Actions). 
6. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record 
pursuant to I.AR. 28(b)(2}. The appellant requests the following documents to 
be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under 
IA.R. 28(b)(2): 
(a) Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment flied January 2, 2014; 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL • Page 2 
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{b) Reply to Petitioners Response to State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal filed January 7, 2014; 
(c) Stipulation to Vacate Hearing filed January 10, 2014; 
(d) Petitioners Response to Respondent's Additional Basis for 
Summary Judgment filed January 29, 2014; 
(e) Petitioner's Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed March 11, 
2014;and 
{f) Any exhibits. affidavits, objections, responses, briefs or 
memorandums, including all attachments or copies of transcripts, filed or 
lodged, by the state, · the appellate, or the court in support of, or in 
opposition to, the dismissal of the Post-Conviction Petition. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on 
the Court Reporter, Maureen Newton; 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee fer the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho 
Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, Idaho Code§ 19-4904, I.AR. 24(4)); 
(c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a post 
conviction case (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 
23(a)(10)); 
(d) That arrangements have been made with Minidoka County who will 
be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client 
is indigent, I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(h); 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3 
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(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.A.R 20. 
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2014. 
~ ~ 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of May, 2014, caused a true 
and correct copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
STEVEN MCRAE 
MCRAE LAW OFFICE PLLC 
121 3RD AVENUE EAST 
JEROME ID 83338 
MAUREEN NEwrON 
COURT REPORTER 
PO B0X368 
RUPERT ID 83350 
LANCE D STEVENSON 
MINIDOKA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
715 G STREET 
P0BOX368 
RUPERT ID 83350 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 03720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attomey General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
L..I <LJD'n1',ell.8 
EVAN SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
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